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THE CRISIS OF THE AMERICAN LAW SCHOOL
Paul Campos*
The economist Herbert Stein once remarked that if something cannot go on forever,
it will stop. Over the past four decades, the cost of legal education in America has
seemed to belie this aphorism: it has gone up relentlessly. Private law school tuition
increased by a factor of four in real, inflation-adjusted terms between 1971 and
2011, while resident tuition at public law schools has nearly quadrupled in real
terms over just the past two decades. Meanwhile, for more than thirty years, the
percentage of the American economy devoted to legal services has been shrinking. In
1978 the legal sector accounted for 2.01 percent of the nation's GDP: by 2009 that
figure had shrunk to 1.37 percent-a 32 percent decrease. These two trends are not
mutually sustainable. If the cost of becoming a lawyer continues to rise while the
economic advantage conferred by a law degree continues to fall, then eventually
both the market for new lawyers and for admission to law school will crash. In the
early years of the 21st century, this abstract theoretical observation has begun to be
confirmed by concrete events. The ongoing contraction in the employment market
for new lawyers has combined with the continuing increase in the cost of legal
education to produce what has begun to be recognized as a genuine crisis for both
law schools and the legal profession
INTRODUCTION
I generally did well in law school-I was one of the students who "got it."
I graduated with honors, honor society, journal etc., and I managed to land
an associate position at a large regional firm in the same city. Though I had
fully intended to work for a non-profit or a legal services-type organization,
my debt load prevented it, and I felt I had to take a job at a firm. I worked
for just over a year and was laid off in late 2009. Since losing my job it has
been a downward spiral.
Though I am incredibly grateful for what I have, I cannot help but wish
for more: I have aJ.D. with honors, an LL.M. from the top tax school in the
country, and meaningful work experience. Yet, I cannot land a full-time,
permanent job. I am lucky to have health insurance, but I have no time off
No sick time. My work situation is flexible (I can come in late/leave early for
an appointment, etc.), but I only get paid for the hours I work. I am ex-
tremely grateful that it is unlikely I will default on my loans-thus far, I
have been able to manage my nearly $250,000 debt with Income-Based Re-
payment and unemployment forbearance.
* Professor, University of Colorado Law School. J.D., University of Michigan Law
School; M.A., University of Michigan; A.B., University of Michigan.
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I know that I am better off than a lot of these younger lawyers. That I
qualified for unemployment is huge. I get job interviews. I can afford the
apartment I share with my friend. I have a great resume. I am an excellent
researcher and writer. I rarely go to bed hungry anymore. I just have to be
patient. As soon as the economy picks up I'll get a permanent job.
Right... ?
I am discouraged. I'm humiliated and demoralized. Worse yet, I am not
challenged on a daily basis. I've resigned myself to the fact that I will never
have a career. I won't have retirement savings. I will be living paycheck-to-
paycheck for the next few years. I will continue to be immune to the rejection
letters I receive in response to the litany of resumes and cover letters I send
out daily (if I even receive indication that my resume was received). I will be
just another number in this generation of lawyers who will fall by the
wayside.
-Excerpted from a letter from a 2007 law school graduate to the author,
dated August 23, 2011.
The economist Herbert Stein once remarked that if something
cannot go on forever, it will stop.' Over the past four decades, the
cost of legal education in America has seemed to belie this apho-
rism: it has gone up relentlessly. Private law school tuition increased
by a factor of four in real (inflation-adjusted) terms between 1971
and 2011,2 while resident tuition at public law schools has nearly
quadrupled in real terms over the past two decades.3 Meanwhile,
for more than thirty years, the percentage of the American econ-
omy devoted to legal services has been shrinking. In 1978 the legal
sector accounted for 2.01 percent of the nation's GDP. By 2009,
that figure had shrunk to 1.37 percent-a 32 percent decrease.
4
These two trends are not mutually sustainable. If the cost of be-
coming a lawyer continues to rise while the economic advantage
1. Herbert Stein, Herb Stein's Unfamiliar Quotations, SLATE (May 16, 1997, 3:30 AM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/business/it-seems to me/1997/05/herbsteinsunfamiliar
-quotations.htsml; see also William D. Henderson & Rachel M. Zahorsky, The Law School Bubble:
How Long Will It Last if Law Grads Can't Pay the Bills?, 98 A.B.A. J. 30 (2012).
2. Data extrapolated from Harvard and Columbia Law School tuition data. See infra
Part I. Many law schools appear to have historically set tuition based on the practices of other
law schools. See Brian Tamanaha, The Responsibility of Yale Law School for the Rise of Law School
Tuition Nationwide-and What It Can Do to Help, BALKINIZAxON (Nov. 21, 2011), http://
balkin.blogspot.com/2011/11/responsibility-of-yale-law-school-for.html.
3. Figures for private and public law school tuition are taken from American Bar Asso-
ciation reports. See generally Am. BAR Ass'N, LAw SCHOOL TUITION 1985-2011, available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal education-and-
admissions to_the_bar/statistics/Is_tuition.authcheckdan.pdf (last visited Aug. 29, 2012).
Throughout this Article, I adjust nominal dollar figures for inflation based on a standard CPI
calculator, found here: http://146.142.4.24/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl.
4. Matt Leichter, A Profession in Decline: BEA Legal Sector Data (1977-), THE L. SCH.
TurnoN BUBBLE, http://lawschooltuitionbubble.wordpress.com/original-research-updated/
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conferred by a law degree continues to fall, then eventually both
the markets for new lawyers and for admission to law school will
crash. In the early years of the 21st century, this abstract theoretical
observation has been confirmed by concrete events. The ongoing
contraction in the employment market for new lawyers has com-
bined with the continuing increase in the cost of legal education to
produce what many now recognize as a genuine crisis for both law
schools and the legal profession.
Part I of this Article describes the increase in the cost of Ameri-
can legal education over the past four decades. Part II explains
some of the most important factors that have driven that increase.
Part III explores the consequences of the increased cost for recent
law graduates and current law students in the context of the chang-
ing employment market for lawyers. Part IV summarizes the situa-
tion and considers what sorts of immediate and long-term changes
are likely to take place in the structure of what I argue has become
a fundamentally unsustainable institution: the contemporary Amer-
ican law school.
PART 1: THE RISE OF AN UNSUSTAINABLE MODEL or
LEGAL EDUCATION
When I enrolled in the University of Michigan Law School in the
fall of 1986, first-year tuition for Michigan residents was $4,420.
5
Adjusting for inflation, this was the equivalent of just over $9,000 in
2011. I would have paid only $800 if I had enrolled at the law
school fifteen years earlier 6-the equivalent of $4,443 in 2011 dol-
lars. From the present perspective, that seems like quite a bargain:
in 2012-2013 resident tuition for first-year law students at Michigan
was $48,012. 7 Remarkably, over the past four decades the real, infla-
tion-adjusted cost of resident tuition at Michigan's law school has
increased more than ten-fold.8 Over the same period, non-resident
tuition has increased in real terms by a factor of "only" 4.4 to
$49,740.
a-profession-in-decline/ (last visited Aug. 29, 2012). Leichter cites Bureau of Economic Anal-
ysis (BEA) data in the article. See Industry Data, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, http://bea.gov/
iTable/indexjindustry.cfm (last visited Aug. 29, 2012).
5. See University of Michigan Law School Tuition 1950-2009, THE UNIV. OF MICH. L. SCH.,
http://www.law.umich.edu/historyandtraditions/students/Documents/LawSchool-Tuition
_History.pdf (last visited Aug. 29, 2012).
6. See id,
7. See 2012-2013 Law School Tuition Rates, L. SCH. TUITON RATEs, http://www.law.
umich.edu/currentstudents/financialaid/Pages/tuition.aspx (last visited Aug. 29, 2012).
8. See supra note 5 (calculation based on tuition increases since the 1970s).
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In this regard, Michigan's law school is far from unique. The
University of Colorado Law School, where I teach, charged $975 in
tuition to state residents thirty years ago (the equivalent of $2,413
in 2011 dollars) and charges more than $31,000 today.9 As a matter
of economic reality, public legal education in America is ceasing to
exist. Many public law schools now charge more in resident tuition
than even the most expensive private schools charged just a few
years ago-this despite the fact that private law school tuition has
also skyrocketed over the course of the last generation.10 Although
the rise in private law school tuition is disturbing, the gradual elimi-
nation of any apparent political commitment to legal education as a
public good is perhaps even more troubling.
I will present historical tuition data in 2011 dollars so that read-
ers may see the extent to which the cost of going to law school has
changed in real economic terms. Below is the change in the tuition







Over the past four decades, Harvard's tuition has more than qua-
drupled in inflation-adjusted terms and has nearly doubled in the
past two decades. 1
Below is the median resident tuition at ABA-accredited public





9. Historical tuition figures for the University of Colorado are based on the school's
catalogue (on file with author).
10. See infra note 12 and accompanying text.
11. For tuition data from 1971 to 2001, see HARvA ID UNIV., FIARVARD LAw ScHooL CATA-
LOGUE 1970-1971, available at http://pds.lib.harvard.edu/pds/iew/8508871. Tuition data
for 2012 is taken from the Law School website. See Student Financial Services: Student Budget,
HARVARD L. SCH., http://www.law.harvard.edu/current/sfs/basics/cost/budget.html (last
visited Aug. 29, 2012).
12. See Am. BAR ASS'N, supra note 3. I have adjusted the nominal dollar figures cited in
the table for inflation. See a/soJohn A. Sebert, The Cost and Financing of Legal Education, 52J.
LEGAL EDuc. 516 (2002) (nominal dollar figures have been adjusted for inflation).
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Since the mid-1980s, private law school tuition has increased by
155.8 percent in real, inflation-adjusted terms, while public law
school resident tuition has increased by an astounding 428.2 per-
cent over inflation. 14 The growth of resident tuition at individual
public law schools over just the past fifteen years is breathtaking
(again, all figures are in constant 2011 dollars): Minnesota Law
School's tuition has increased from $11,890 to $35,000, Ohio State
Law School's from $5,860 to $27,800, Texas Law School's from
$5,340 to $27,748, and Illinois Law School's from $7,225 to
$40,600.'5 Recently, the University of California-Berkeley Boalt
School of Law became the first public law school to charge a resi-
dent tuition of more than $50,000,16 but several more seem sure to
follow. 17 According to one projection, tuition at nearly a dozen law
schools will be over $70,000 per year by the end of the decade.' 8
To understand what these numbers mean for the cost of the
American legal education for the average American family, con-
sider the University of Michigan Law School, by some measures the
nation's most elite public law school. Recall that in 1971, annual
resident tuition was $4,443 in 2011 dollars. 19 In that year, median
household income in America was $49,709 in 2011 dollars. 20 One
year's resident tuition at what was then, and remains now, one of
13. See AM. BAR Ass'N, supra note 3.
14. See id.
15. Law School Rankings by Tuition, INTERNET LEGAL REs. GRP., http://www.ilrg.com/
schools/tuition/ (last visited Aug. 29, 2012). Again, I have adjusted the nominal figures for
inflation. 2011-2012 data is taken from each law school's website.
16. Fees & Cost of Attendance, BERKELEY L., UNV. OF CAL., http://www.law.berkeley.edu/
6943.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2012).
17. See Karen Sloan, Tuition Is Still Growing, NAT'L L.J. (Aug. 20, 2012), http://www.
law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202567898209&Tuition-isstill-growing&slreturn=2
0120728213533 (stating that average resident tuition at public law schools rose by 6 percent).
18. Matt Leichter, Private Law School Tuition Projections, THE L. ScM. TUITION BUBBLE,
http://awschooltuitionbubble.wordpress.com/original-research-updated/tuition-
projections/ (last visited Aug. 29, 2012).
19. See supra text accompanying note 6.
20. See Historical Income Tables: Households, U.S. CENSUS BuREAu, http://www.census.gov/
hhes/www/income/data/historical/household/index.html (last visited Aug. 9, 2012).
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the nation's pre-eminent law schools cost about one month's pre-
tax income for the average American household.
In 2011, median household income in America was $49,909, al-
most exactly what it was forty years ago after adjusting for infla-
tion.2 1 But now the average American household would need to
spend slightly less than an entire year's worth of pre-tax income to
pay for a year's resident tuition at Michigan Law School. Below is
the change over time in the percentage of pre-tax annual income
that the median American household would have to pay for resi-
dent tuition at Michigan:
* 1970: 7.9 percent
* 1980: 11.3 percent
* 1990: 22.8 percent
* 2000: 49.3 percent
* 2011: 93.8 percent
22
Over this time span, during which median household income
saw essentially no net growth, the nation's real, inflation-adjusted
gross domestic product more than tripled, and more than doubled
in per capita terms.2 3 America is, overall, three times richer than it
was forty years ago. But the cost of attending law school has in-
creased by a factor of four at elite private law schools and by a factor
of more than ten for resident students at one of the nation's most
elite public law schools. The estimated total cost of attendance for
most law schools is now more than $150,000 and has topped
$200,000 at many of them.24 Meanwhile, the average American fam-
ily enjoys only about $17 more per month in income in real terms
than it did four decades ago.
Law school tuition increases have occurred within the larger con-
text of the rising cost of a college education in America. Although
undergraduate tuition has not risen nearly as fast as the cost of law
21. Robert Pear, Recession Officially Over, U.S. Incomes Kept Falling, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9,
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/1O/us/recession-officially-over-us-incomes-kept-
falling.html.
22. I calculated these percentages by comparing tuition figures to the median house-
hold income in the relevant year, as reported by the Census. See INTERNET LEGAL RES. GRP.,
supra note 15.
23. What Was the U.S. GDP Then?, MEASURING WORTH, http://measuringworth.com/
usgdp/ (last visited Aug. 29, 2012).
24. For example, George Washington Law School estimates that the annual cost of at-
tendance for the 2011-12 academic year-including tuition, fees, and nine months of cost of
living expenses-is $74,400. See Tuition & Estimated Costs, THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIV.,
http://www.law.gwu.edu/Admissions/tuiion/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Aug, 29,
2012). The total cost of a law degree at many public law schools now exceeds what an average
private law school education cost just a few years ago.
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school, undergraduate tuition has increased far faster than inflation
over the past generation, 25 and almost all law schools require that
applicants complete a four-year undergraduate degree before en-
rolling.26 Family incomes have stagnated for most Americans over
the course of the last generation, and many families have had to
debt-finance their children's college educations.27 Many students
thus enter law school already carrying significant educational debt.
According to one estimate, the average amount of educational debt
carried by indebted graduates of four-year colleges was nearly
$25,000.28
A legal education was easily within the financial reach of the
American middle class a generation ago and was a realistic career
option for people of more modest socio-economic backgrounds. It
is now an enormously expensive investment. Given how the employ-
ment market for people with law degrees has changed over the
same period, that investment has become a remarkably risky gam-
ble. How did this happen?
PART II: CENTRAL FEATURES OF A FAILING MODEL
This section discusses several factors that have contributed to the
increasing cost of legal education: drastic declines in student-faculty
ratios, large increases in faculty compensation, the creation and de-
velopment of clinical legal education, the expansion of administra-
tive staffs, and expensive capital construction projects. A generation
ago, the typical American law school featured large classes, rare to
non-existent clinical programs, a high tenure-track faculty-to-
student ratio, significant numbers of inexpensive adjunct instruc-
tors, no laboratory equipment, and a generally unprepossessing
physical plant.29 Even at many elite universities, the law faculty had
25. Law School Tuition Soars, N.Y. TIMEs (July 17, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/
imagepages/2011/07/17/business/ 171egalGraphic.html?ref-business.
26. What Education or Type of Degree is Needed to Be a Lawyer?, EDUC. PORTAL, http://
education-portal.com/education-needed-to.be-a-lawyer.html (last visited Aug. 29, 2012).
27. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
28. This figure is based on graduates of four-year colleges who graduated in the
2007-2008 academic year. With tuition increases continuing to outrun inflation, the most
current figures are undoubtedly higher in real dollar as well as nominal terms. See National
Postsecondary Student Aid Study, NAT'L CTR. FOR EDuc. STATISTICS, http://nces.ed.gov/surveys/
npsas/undergraduate.asp (last visited Aug. 29, 2012). Approximately two-thirds of college
graduates incur undergraduate debt. See Andrew Martin & Andrew W. Lehren, A Generation
Hobbled by the Soaring Cost of College, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/05/13/business/student-loans-weighing-down-a-generaion-with-heavy-debt.html?page
wanted=all.
29. See generally BRIAN TAmANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS (forthcoming 2012).
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comparatively little academic ambition or pretension: at most law
schools, faculty members who regularly published scholarship after
completing an often-cursory tenure process were very much the ex-
ception rather than the rule.
3 0
Given this environment, law school faculty often had relatively
heavy teaching loads: five to six classes a year was normal at most
schools, while teaching four classes per year at a few elite schools
was a luxury of such privileged positions.3 1 At almost all schools,
administrative support for both the tenure-track faculty and the stu-
dent body was minimal. Faculty were expected to contribute signifi-
cantly to tasks such as admissions and financial aid, while students
looking for job opportunities were expected to consult a bulletin
board rather than the contemporary career services office.
3 2
A. Student-Faculty Ratios
Over the past thirty years, and particularly over the past fifteen,
this situation has altered dramatically. Consider what has happened
to student-faculty ratios. Currently, an ABA-accredited law school's
student-faculty ratio is calculated as follows: each full-time tenure-
track member counts as one faculty position, while faculty members
who teach full-time but are not on the tenure track (as is often the
case with clinical professors and legal research and writing profes-
sors) each count as seven-tenths of a position. Adjunct professors
count as one-fifth of a position." Non-tenure track faculty may not
account for more than 20 percent of a school's student-faculty ratio
for the purposes of accreditation. Under the current accreditation
standards, "[a] ratio of 20:1 or less presumptively indicates that a
law school complies with the Standards," while "[a] ratio of 30:1 or
more presumptively indicates that a law school does not." Ratios
30. See Richard A. Posner, Legal Scholarship Today, 115 HARv, L. Rs-v, 1314, 1320 (2002).
31. See TAMANAmA, supra note 29 at 39-53.
32. I can attest to much of this change first-hand, even though I have been a legal aca-
demic "only" since 1990. A glance at the personnel listings in law school catalogues and in
the AALS Directory of Law Teachers will confirm the enormous growth in the number of
administrative personnel at American law schools over the course of the last generation. See
AALS Directory of Law Teachers, Ass'N OF Am. LAw Sc-is., http://www.aals.org/serices
directory.php (last visited Aug. 29, 2012).
33. See Am. BAR ASS'N, A.B.A. STANDARDS AND RuLEs OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW
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between 20:1 and 30:1 create no presumption one way or the
other.
34
The stated purpose of these ratios is to maintain educational
standards. In practice, they maintain barriers to entry to low-cost
competitor law schools and protect the privileges of current tenure-
track faculty at ABA-accredited schools, by insulating them from po-
tential lower-cost competition. The idea that a law school with a
student-faculty ratio of 30:1 presumptively fails to provide a mini-
mally adequate legal education to its students is, within even the
narrowest of historical contexts, problematic. As recently as 1978,
the average student-faculty ratio at ABA-accredited law schools was
29:1; nearly half of all such schools would have been out of compli-
ance with the current accreditation standards.
3 5
In fact, faculty-to-student ratios have dropped dramatically at law
schools, not merely since 1978 but over the past decade. For exam-
ple, Harvard's ratio fell from 21.6:1 in 1998 (i.e., Harvard Law
School's student-faculty ratio fourteen years ago was not even pre-
sumptively adequate under the ABA's current standards) to 10.3:1
in 2008. Stanford Law School's ratio fell even more drastically, from
18.3:1 to 8.3:1, while the University of Chicago Law School's went
from 19.1:1 to 10.3:1.-3 This pattern was not confined to elite
schools, in part because schools further down the law school hierar-
chy tend to imitate elite schools. During this same period, for exam-
ple, Emory Law School's student-faculty ratio declined from 19.1:1
to 10.8:1, Seton Hall Law School's declined from 26:1 to 15.5:1, and
Widener Law School's declined from 24.8:1 to 13.7:1.7 And ratios
are continuing to drop. in the spring of 2012, Dean Larry Kramer
announced that as part of Stanford's ongoing efforts to protect and
improve its ranking (Stanford moved from third to second in the
U.S. News and World Report Law School Rankings in 2012), the
school was going to expand its tenure-track faculty by 25 percent.3 8
Overall, average student-faculty ratios at ABA-accredited schools
34. See A.M. BAR Ass'N, A.B.A STANDARDS AND RuLEs OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW
SCHOOLS 2012-2013 31 (2012), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/danr/aba/
publications/rnisc/legal-education/Standards/2012_201 3_abastandards_and.rules.auth
checkdam.pdf.
35. Law School Faculties 40% Larger Than Ten Years Ago, THE NAT'LJURIST (Mar. 9, 2010,
10:00 PM), http://www.nationaljurist.com/content/law-school-faculties-4 0-arger-10-years-
ago.
36. By 2011 Stanford's student-faculty ratio had declined to 7.8 to 1, and Chicago's had
fallen to 8.1 to 1. Harvard's had risen to 12.2 to 1. See Law School Admission Council Official
Guide to Law Schools, LAw SCH. ADMISSION COUNCIL, http://www.lsac-.org/jd/default.asp (last
visited Aug. 29, 2012).
37. Id.
38. Larry Kramer, Dean, Stanford Law School, Address at Stanford Town Hall Meeting
(Feb. 2012) (information provided by attendees).
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were cut in half between the late 1970s and the early years of the
21st century, going from 29:1 to 14.7:1.39
What consequences has this enormous increase in the number of
law school faculty had for legal education? First, there has been no
proportional decline in the size of law school classes. Large lecture
sections are still the staple of American legal education. Instead,
the primary effect of this change has been to reduce the teaching
loads of faculty, particularly tenure-track faculty. Almost all "top
tier" schools, meaning the top fifty law schools as ranked by U.S.
News & World Report, have moved to a formal three-course teaching
load for tenure-track faculty, while at the most elite schools, gener-
ous research leave and sabbatical policies make the functional
teaching load closer to two classes per academic year.4° Meanwhile
a number of lower-ranked schools are also adopting three-course
teaching loads, at least for more "productive" faculty i.e., those who
publish more law review articles.4
1
Thus over the course of the last four decades, American law
schools have moved from a system in which faculty at a few elite law
schools taught four classes per year, while faculty at other schools
taught five or six, to a system in which those numbers have been
reduced by nearly 50 percent at elite schools and by nearly as much
at many non-elite schools as well. 42 As detailed below, this change
has played a considerable role in driving up the cost of legal educa-
tion. Before turning to the specific financial consequences of this
change, we should not overlook the enormous increase in spending
on faculty compensation at law schools, which has been dedicated
to goals other than improving the classroom experience of law
students.
39. See supra note 35.
40. Gordon Smith, Law Professor Teaching Loads, CONGLOMERATE BLOG (Apr. 12, 2005),
http://www.theconglomerate.org/2005/04/law-professor-t.html. As for the functional
teaching loads at elite law schools, I was informed by David Van Zandt, Dean of Northwestern
Law School, in the fall of 1996 that the average teaching load at the school over a multi-year
period was seven credit hours per year, i.e., two classes. Other conversations in November of
1996 with members of similarly ranked law schools confirm that this has become a common
de facto teaching schedule, at least as a matter of informal practice.
41. In the fall of 2011, a faculty member at a law school ranked close to number 100
(that is the midpoint) in the U.S. News and World Report rankings told me that the dean had
announced that the school was moving to a standard three-course teaching load. The faculty
member noted that, despite the combination of skyrocketing tuition costs and dire job pros-
pects for the school's most recent graduates, this announcement encountered no objections.
42. See TAmANAR-, supra note 29.
The Crisis of the American Law School
B. Faculty Compensation
Law schools have greatly increased the size of their faculties to
ensure that individual faculty could teach less. And they have likely
made this change so that their faculties could publish more law re-
view articles. With regard to this goal, American law schools have
enjoyed spectacular success. A survey of the legal academic litera-
ture reveals that professors at American law schools published ap-
proximately 1,650 law review articles in 1970 and nearly 10,000 in
2010.43 Over that time, the total number of tenure-track law profes-
sors has roughly doubled, while the per capita publication rate of
law review articles per professor has nearly tripled, resulting in this
approximately six-fold increase in the size of the annual law review
literature .44
This explosion in publication rates has naturally required a huge
increase in the venues for legal academic writing. Forty years ago,
very few law schools published more than one law journal, and
some did not publish any at all. In 2010 the Current Index to Legal
Periodicals catalogued 616 lawjournals, while omitting a number of
venues in which legal academic publications appear.
45
How much has all this cost? Cutting student-faculty ratios by 50
percent would, holding everything else constant, double the por-
tion of law school budgets dedicated to faculty compensation. But
everything else has not remained constant. Individual law school
faculty compensation has increased dramatically over the course of
the past generation. Precise numbers on this question are difficult
to obtain for a variety of reasons. At private law schools, salary
figures are confidential. Even at public schools, overall compensa-
tion packages now can include a number of features beyond base
salary-such as so-called summer research money (it is generally
known in legal academia that this has become a de facto salary sup-
plement at most schools), subsidized housing, low-interest loans,
43. See Current Index to Legal Periodicals, UNiv. OF WASH. SCH. OF LAW, http://
lib.law.washington.edu/cilp/cilp.html (last visited Aug. 29, 2012). I derived these figures by
examining statistically representative samples of both the Current Index to Legal Periodicals
and individual volumes of particular law reviews. Specifically, I examined thirty randomly
selected pages from the Index in both 1970 and 2010 and noted the total number of law
review articles that they catalogued. I then extrapolated this number to the Index as a whole.
I double-checked this estimate by examining the annual volumes of twelve representative law
reviews in each year, noting how many articles these reviews published, and extrapolated on
the basis of that figure.
44. See ASs'N OF AM. LAw ScHS., supra note 32. The number of tenure-track law faculty is
based on surveys of the 1970-71, 1990-91, and 2010-11 volumes of the annual Association of
American Law Schools Directory of Law Teachers.
45. See supra note 43.
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and retention bonuses-that can be hard to calculate. Still, the gen-
eral pattern is clear: At elite law schools, compensation for tenure-
track faculty has roughly doubled in real terms over the course of
the past thirty years. At non-elite schools, the increase in compensa-
tion levels has varied, but given that almost all increased spending
at law schools is set by the rules of a positional game created by law
school rankings, in which non-elites attempt to imitate elite schools
to the extent possible, it is probable that faculty compensation all
across legal academia has increased sharply over the past three
decades.
As for specific numbers, we can begin with Chief Justice John
Roberts's observation that salaries for federal judges are now "about
half' the salaries for senior faculty at elite law schools. 46 At the time
Roberts made his comments in a report to Congress, in which he
was pleading for higher pay for the federal judiciary, federal district
and circuit court judges were paid $169,000 and $179,000 respec-
tively, while senior faculty at elite schools likely earned around
$350,000.
47
A survey of faculty compensation at high-ranked public law
schools confirms that the Chief Justice's estimate is not an exagger-
ation and may even be an understatement. For instance, at the Uni-
versity of Texas Law School, a lawsuit brought by a faculty member
revealed not only the compensation packages of the law school's
faculty but also how deceptive the available public records regard-
ing faculty salaries can be.
48
According to a searchable Internet database of University of
Texas employee salaries, the salaries of Texas's law school faculty
(excluding administrative salaries) in 2010-2011 ranged from
$135,000 to $272,404. 49 The actual numbers, as revealed by the law-
suit, were in many cases nearly 50 percent higher. The public
records do not include summer research money, which for most
faculty was equivalent to one-third of their base salaries.5 0 Nor do
they include retention bonus money, structured in the form of "for-
givable loans," given by the dean to twenty-five faculty members
(and, more problematically, to himself-a fact that when made
46. See Linda Greenhouse, ChiefJustice Advocates Higher Pay for Judiciary, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan.
1, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2O07/01/01/us/Olscotus.html.
47. See id.
48. The relevant documents can be viewed at http://d2o6nd3dubbyr6.cloudfront.net/
media/documents/ut law school open-records.pdf (last visited Aug. 29, 2012).
49. See School of Law Salaries at the University of Texas at Austin, THE TEX. TRIB., http://
www.texastribune.org/library/data/government-employee-salaries/the-university-of-texas-at-
austin/departments/school-of-law/17771/?page=I (last visited Aug. 29, 2012).
50. See supra notes 48-49.
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public forced his resignation) .51 The result was that much of the law
school's senior faculty was making between $320,000 and $410,000
in 2010-with the top half of that range being higher than Chief
Justice Roberts's estimate for top schools.
Data from other top public law schools reveal somewhat lower
compensation packages than those given to faculty at Texas, al-
though this might be in part because the financial data is less com-
prehensive than that which would be uncovered by litigation. Nor
does the total listed compensation, at Texas or elsewhere, include
deferred benefits, such as employer contributions to pension plans,
which, based on my knowledge of several representative schools, is
likely equivalent at many schools to one-tenth of a faculty member's
salary. Still, searching an online University of California database
reveals that in 2010, fifteen law professors in the University of Cali-
fornia system had base salaries and summer research support
amounting to at least $308,000, with a high of $360,000.52 Bearing
in mind that the half-dozen highest-ranked law schools, including
those with the largest private endowments, are all private institu-
tions, these schools may be paying their faculty at least as much as
Texas is paying its professors, especially considering how much
higher the cost of living is in Cambridge, Chicago, and New York
than in Austin.
53
Though, in general, the higher a school is ranked the higher the
salary scale for its faculty, the $300,000+ compensation packages
paid to professors at elite and sub-elite institutions have a ripple
effect throughout legal academia, as lower-ranked schools fight to
hold onto their most productive faculty.5 4 For instance, three years
ago the fifteen highest-paid faculty members of the University of
Illinois College of Law made between $203,000 and $293,000 in
51. See National Jurist: Dean Sager's $4.65 Million in Forgivable Loaws to Law Profs 'Ripped
Apart' Texas Faculty, TAX PROF. BLOG (Feb. 21, 2012), http://taxprof.typepad.com/
taxprof-blog/2012/02/nationaljurist-.html.
52. See University of California Data Analysis-Browse UC Salary Data, UNIV. OF CAL, DATA
ANALYSIS, http://ucpay.globl.org/index.php?campus=&name=&title=!PROFESSOR-LAW+
SCHOOL+SCALE&base=&overtime=&extra=&gross=&year-2010&s=gross (last visited Aug.
30, 2012). This index lists only compensation from the university system and not from private
endowments, so it may represent a significant understatement of the total number of profes-
sors receiving compensation packages of at least $300,000.
53. TA4ANAIA, supra note 29 at 49 ("If Texas professors are compensated at this level,
given the nature of the market it is likely many professors at top five law schools are in the
$300,000-$400,000 range, with some earning more.").
54. Again, despite the variety of tasks legal academics perform in the course of their
professional duties, "productivity" in legal academia is measured almost exclusively by how
many law review articles a faculty member publishes, especially in what are considered promi-
nent venues. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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base salary alone, not counting summer research money.55 And a
perusal of IRS Form 990, which requires non-profit organizations to
list the compensation packages of their highest paid officers and
employees, reveals that professorial salaries in the $300,000 range
are far from rare, even at second- and third-tier schools. 56 In his
forthcoming book, Failing Law Schools, Brian Tamanaha, a law pro-
fessor at Washington University in St. Louis and former dean of St.
John's Law School, estimates that faculty compensation packages of
over $200,000, excluding benefits, are now commonplace for full-
time professors at a wide variety of schools.
57
Historical data regarding law professor salaries are harder to
come by. Returning to Chief Justice Roberts's complaint regarding
judicial salaries, the Chief Justice revealed that senior professors at
Harvard Law School were paid $28,000 in 1969, which is $171,000
in 2011 dollars.58 This suggests, in light of the data presented above,
that Harvard Law School faculty salaries have more than doubled in
real terms since then. In order to analyze this question in a more
systematic fashion, I compared the salaries of the University of
Michigan Law School faculty in 1981 to those of the same faculty in
2011. The base salary of the tenure-track faculty in 1981 ranged
from $31,000 to $67,000, i.e., from $77,000 to $165,000 in 2011 dol-
lars.59 The base salary of the tenure-track faculty in 2011 ranged
55. See University of Illinois Public Salaries, COLIEGIATE TIMES, http://www.collegiatetimes
.com/databases/salaries/university-of-ilinois-2009?dept=Law (last visited Aug. 29, 2012).
Summer research stipend amounts are available at the SALT salary survey. See Society of
American Law Teachers, 2011-12 SALT Salary Survey, SALT EQUALIZER (2012), available at
http://www.satlaw.org/userfiles/SALT%20salary%20survey%202012.pdf. Summer research
stipends vary enormously between schools, so their absence from public data bases that re-
cord official faculty compensation poses a serious barrier to comparing salaries even between
public law schools. These stipends are usually either a percentage of a faculty member's base
salary, or a flat figure for all faculty members who receive them. I have found current sum-
mer research stipends ranging from $8,000 to $93,000.
56. Form 990 disclosures can be found by searching for a particular school at 990 Finder,
FoUND. CTR., http://foundationcenter.org/findfunders/990finder/ (last visited Aug. 29,
2012).
57. See TA vANAHA, supra note 29, at 48 passim. At my school, approximately half of the
tenured faculty receives annual compensation packages, in base salary and summer support,
exceeding $200,000. According to a recent report submitted by the Law School to the Uni-
versity of Colorado's central administration, the Law School's compensation structure lags
behind that of many of our "peer schools" (defined as law schools at "flagship" state universi-
ties) (data from an internal Law School document on file with author).
58. See Linda Greenhouse, ChiefJustice Advocates Higher Pay for Judiciary, N.Y. Tnas, Jan.
1, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/01/us/Olscotus.html.
59. Base salary data is available in the archives of the Bentley Historical Library at the
University of Michigan. In 1981, the law school paid faculty members who received summer
stipends equivalent to approximately one-sixth of their base salaries, i.e., slightly more in
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from $162,000 to $294,000.60 In 2011, faculty summer research sup-
port was 15 percent of base salary, meaning that the functional base
salary of the faculty actually ranged from $186,000 to $338,000.61
Remarkably, a brand-new tenure-track assistant professor at Michi-
gan makes nearly as much, in real dollars, as what the highest-paid
member of the faculty made thirty years earlier. Even more remark-
ably, this brand new professor makes more than the dean of the law
school made in 1981. The law school's dean was paid $164,510, in
2011 dollars, in 1981. In 2011, the dean was paid $457,964.62
These figures reinforce Chief Justice Roberts's estimate that di-
rect faculty compensation at top law schools has roughly doubled
over the course of the last generation. But pecuniary compensation
is only part of the story. As we have seen, teaching loads have
shrunk significantly over this same time frame.63 Nor have we ex-
plored one of the most important changes to the structure of law
school teaching over the course of the last generation: the transfor-
mation of clinical legal education from a marginal feature of a few
legal academic institutions into a central, well-funded enterprise at
most law schools.
C. The Birth of the Clinic
The birth and expansion of legal aid clinics in law schools has
had three effects on American legal education: it has increased the
amount of practically-oriented legal education some students re-
ceive; it has allowed traditional tenure-track faculty to rationalize
paying relatively little attention to actual legal practice; and it has
played a role in driving up the cost of legal education. Complaints
that law school teaches students nothing about practice are hardly
percentage terms than the 15 percent of base salary current faculty members receive (al-
though from a far smaller base). I am indebted to Professor Edward Cooper for the informa-
tion on how summer money was calculated in 1981, which was provided to me in a
conversation on March 25, 2012.
60. See Department Results for 2012, UMSAARY.INFO, http://www.umsalary.info/dept
search.php?Dept=Law%20School&Year-0&Campus=I (last visited Aug. 10, 2012).
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. It is worth noting that grading exams-
perhaps the most unpleasant task that those who perform this remarkably pleasant job are
required to do-has also become far easier over the course of the last ten to fifteen years.
Gone are the days when the leisure of the theory class was interrupted by the burden of
having to decipher the panicked scrawls of hundreds of students, spread across thousands of
pages of blue books. Indeed today some professors employ computer technology to grade
multiple choice exams, thus eliminating a few dozen of the most painful of the few hundred
hours per year a legal academic is formally required to dedicate to his or her job.
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new. 64 Legal aid clinics were, among other things, originally a re-
sponse to those complaints. 6 5 In this regard, they have had some
effect, but whether that effect has been to make law school gradu-
ates more practice-ready than they would have been otherwise is
debatable.
The clinical legal experience no doubt helps participating stu-
dents have a better understanding of some forms of legal practice.
Most law students, however, complete their legal educations with-
out having participated in a clinic. 66 This fact raises a question: what
effect does the availability of clinical legal education have on what
goes on in the traditional, "doctrinal" classroom? If the effect is to
make doctrinal legal education even less practical than it would
otherwise be-because the doctrinal faculty believes, either con-
sciously or otherwise, that students learn the nuts and bolts of legal
practice in clinical classes (which, in fact, most law students never
take)-then, paradoxically, clinical legal education may have a net
effect of making legal education as a whole less practical than ever
for the average student.
This becomes a particularly pressing issue when one considers
the expense of clinical legal education. Since instructor-participant
ratios must be very low, and clinics require significant administra-
tive support, they cost a lot of money.67 Yet, in response to regular
complaints from the legal profession that law school is too "theoret-
ical," law schools continue to expand their clinical programs, with-
out much in the way of evidence regarding whether the costs they
incur are justified by the results they produce in regard to produc-
ing "practice-ready" graduates. 68
64. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy, 32J. LE-
GAL EDuc. 591, 595-96 (1982). Kennedy treats the claim that law students "learn[ ] nothing
about practice" as completely self-evident. See id.
65. See David Barnhizer, The University Ideal and Clinical Legal Education, 35 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 87, 88 (1990).
66. See Rebecca Sandefur & Jeffrey Selbin, The Clinic Effect, 16 CLINICAL L. Rzv. 57, 78
(2009) ("[T]he 2007 C.S.A.L.E. Report found that 32% of law students participated in live
client law school clinics.").
67. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking Legal Education, 43 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 595,
595 (2008).
68. See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOP-
MENT: AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM (IMACCRATE REPORT) (1992); WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET
AL., EDUCATING LAvW'ERs: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW (2007). Note that by "too
theoretical" critics generally mean "too doctrinal," which is certainly a contestable characteri-
zation of how genuinely theoretical-or edifying-the traditional doctrinal law school class-
room actually is. See Kennedy, supra note 64.
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D. New Buildings Full of People
The birth of the clinic is just one example of how many of what
used to be the job responsibilities of tenure-track faculty have been
off-loaded to new classes of law school employees. A generation
ago, classes in legal research and writing, to the extent that they
were taught at all, were typically taught by the tenure-track faculty,
rather than by full-time faculty members hired for that specific pur-
pose.69 Outside of the classroom, the administrative duties of law
professors have declined considerably. No longer are professors,
whether at elite or non-elite law schools, expected to do the heavy
lifting in the admissions office or in distributing financial aid or in
regard to all the functions now outsourced to career services per-
sonnel, fundraising officers, public relations specialists, alumni liai-
sons, and the like. As noted above, all these changes in regard to
the nature of a legal academic's workload have likely taken place
for the primary purpose of allowing law faculty to publish far more
law journal articles than they did a generation ago-and publish
they have.
70
Of course, this outsourcing has itself incurred considerable extra
expense: law school administrative staffs have grown at a far faster
pace than even the rapidly expanding tenure-track faculties of
schools accredited by the ABA.7' The number of full-time adminis-
trators who also teach-deans, librarians, and other law school per-
sonnel-more than tripled from 1998 to 2008, increasing from 528
to 1,659.72 And although there are no national statistics on how
much administrative staffs in general have grown, comparing a typi-
cal law school catalogue from even ten or fifteen years ago to the
current version will likely reveal massive growth in the institution's
administrative apparatus.
The explosion in the number of law school faculty and adminis-
trative staff, both in absolute terms and relative to student enroll-
ment, is both a cause and a consequence of the veritable mania for
69. As recently as twenty-five years ago, when I was a first-year law student at a resource-
rich institution, legal research and writing classes at Michigan Law School were taught by
third-year law students to first year students, rather than by legal research and writing faculty.
70. A law professor who read a law review article every day of the year would spend 28
years reading the law review literature published by professors at American law schools in
2010 alone.
7L, See TAMAHANA, supra note 29, at 126-28.
72. See THE NAT'LJURIST, supra note 35. Keep in mind that the "deans" referred to in this
statistic do not include the dean of the law school. While a generation ago it was not unusual
for a law school's dean to teach at least one class per year, such double duty would be consid-
ered wholly unreasonable in an age when a law school dean's job has come to be dominated
by constant fundraising and the attendant frequent flyer miles.
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capital construction projects that has gripped higher education in
general, and law schools in particular, over the past generation.73 In
recent years, numerous law schools have built new main buildings
or expanded existing facilities, even when they already possessed
impressive, even magnificent physical plants.74 Law school building
campaigns are often classic examples of conspicuous consumption
at the social-institutional, rather than at the individual, level: School
A builds a fancy new building, and as a result School B discovers
that it "needs" a new building too, in order to keep up with the
academic Joneses.
75
Admittedly, building campaigns are generally funded via some
combination of private money, a university's general fund, and, at
public schools, tax dollars. But when such efforts fall short, part of
the direct cost could potentially be transferred to law students. An-
other complicating factor is that to some extent, money is, as law
students learn to say, fungible: a dollar spent on the physical plant
is, to a degree, a dollar that isn't going to be spent on something
else, such as holding down tuition increases. 76 In addition it seems
quite odd to be pumping ever-greater sums into bricks and mortar,
given changes in information technology that enable education to
take place outside of a $100 million structure. 77 This point applies
with special force to law libraries, which grow ever-more pharaonic
even as the practice of law becomes less book-based, and as, if my
73. See, e.g., Law School Dedicates New Building, HARV. GAZETrE, Apr. 23, 2012, http: //
news. harvard. edu / gazette / story/2012 / 04 / law-school-dedicates- new-building/, Michi-
gan Law School is in the process of completing a $102 million building to supplement the
superb Oxbridge-style quadrangle that houses the institution. See Law School Building Project: A
New Legal Landscape, UNIV. OF MICH. LAW ScH., http://www.law.umich.edu/buildingproject/
Pages/home.aspx (last visited Aug. 30, 2012). Harvard recently added a 250,000-square-foot
structure to its law school campus. See I-ARv. GAXE-TrE, supra.
74. See, e.g., sources cited at note 72, supra.
75. One can see this same process taking place all over the university, as schools build
posh dorms and amenities like recreation centers, to compete for students who generally
don't realize that they, their families, or both are purchasing such amenities at far too high a
price. This phenomenon has been referred to as an "amenities race." See Kyle Stokes, In
College Dorms and Dining, How Nice Is Too Nice?, ST. IMPACr (Aug. 18, 2011, 2:54 PM), http://
stateimpact.npr.org/indiana/2011/08/18/in-college-dorms-and-dining-how-nice-is-too-nice/
76. The law school at which I teach began constructing a new building at a time when
the same sum of money necessary to build it could have generated an income stream that
would have provided full-tuition scholarships for half the student body.
77. Consider, for example, the remarkably successful initiative undertaken recently by
faculty at Stanford to offer free online courses in Computer Science. See Steve Henn, Stanford
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own observations are accurate, law students find it less and less nec-
essary or desirable to use these literary labyrinths even as opulent
study spaces.
A more insidious complication is likely obvious to anyone who
has ever bought a house that was somewhat bigger and fancier than
one's previous residence. Such purchasers feel impelled by some-
thing akin to a social gravitational force to fill their new houses up
with things they would not have bought if they did not have all that
new space to fill. The same thing happens in academia: an institu-
tion sinks enormous capital, both literally and metaphorically, into
getting an impressive new building with much more space than was
available in what in retrospect becomes its intolerably inadequate
prior facilities, and as if by magic all sorts of new "centers" and
"groups" and, most of all, administrative personnel appear almost
overnight.
78
E. Other Drivers of Increased Costs
Decreased student to faculty ratios, increased faculty compensa-
tion, legal aid clinics, legal writing programs, greatly expanded ad-
ministrative staffs, and newer, more expensive facilities are not the
only reasons why the cost of law school has skyrocketed over the
course of the past generation. Higher starting salaries at large law
firms were correlated with increased demand for legal education in
the first half of the previous decade. 79 At public law schools, reduc-
tions in state subsidies have played a role (Note, however, that if,
for example a law school doubles its operating budget, while state
78. It is not as if none of these additions have educational value. For example, all other
things being equal, it is no doubt desirable to have six career services persons housed in a
suite of nice new offices, doing what they can to help students and graduates get jobs. The
problem, of course, is that all other things are never equal. When I started teaching twenty-
one years ago, my law school's career services department consisted of one part-time em-
ployee who had a desk in the admissions office. Coming as I did from the resplendent
environs of the elite law school where I had so recently been a student, this seemed on one
level rather absurd. On quite another level, resident tuition was literally one-tenth of what it
is today. The point is that, as always, the question needs to be not "does this expenditure
improve the quality of what the law school is doing" (whatever that may be), but rather, "does
it do so at a reasonable cost?" Because of the dysfunctional way that legal education is priced
and paid for, this question is rarely asked as often or as insistently as it ought to be by those
who are in the best position to affect the answer.
79. Law school applications rose from about seventy-five thousand in 2000 to nearly one
hundred thousand in 2004. See LSAC Volume Summary, LAw SCH. ADMISSION COUNCIL, http://
www.sac.org/LSACResources/Data/LSAC-volume-summary.asp (last visited Aug. 30, 2012).
Between 1997 and 2006, the "going rate" (the salary paid to new associates by the top New
York law firms) went from $116,000 to $160,000 in constant dollars.
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subsidies to the school increase at a lower rate, this may be charac-
terized by the school as a "cut" in state support.) Law schools spend
more on self-promotion and advertising than ever before.au And at
some universities, the central administration continues to treat the
law school as a revenue source for cross-subsidization (a so-called
"cash cow"), although there is little indication that this percentage
has increased in recent years.
Underlying this financial arms race is the ever-present rationale
that refusing to spend yet more money on faculty, administration,
physical plant, self-promotional efforts, and so forth is not an op-
tion in the constant struggle to enhance, or at least sustain, a
school's U.S. News ranking. Indeed, the rankings directly reward
inefficiency, as the ranking formula treats expenditures per student
as proxies for educational quality.81 This rationale has created a
negative-sum positional game, where one school's gain is always
some other school's loss. It has also exacerbated the classic collec-
tive action problem that describes the economics of today's law
schools: no school wants to pay the short-term price for bucking a
system that in the long term is not sustainable for the enterprise as
a whole.
Nevertheless, while in the long term law schools will pay the price
for being unable to break free from the vicious cycle of having to
constantly increase revenue merely to stay in the same place relative
to their competitors, at present that price is being borne most di-
rectly by law school graduates, who year after year pay more and
more for an educational credential whose real value has been de-
clining for some time now.82 What are the practical consequences
of creating a system of legal education in which most students must
now pay somewhere between $150,000 to $250,000 in direct costs,
as well as incurring significant opportunity costs, to become eligible
80. This has given birth to the ubiquitous phenomenon of so-called "law porn": glossy
publications that law schools mail out by the thousands to other law faculties, law firms, and
the media, in an attempt to holster their reputations and thereby positively affect their rank-
ing in the U.S. News formula. For a skeptical look at the effectiveness of these efforts, see
David Bernstein, Ineffective "Law Porn," THE VOI.OKH CONSP[RACY (Sept. 27, 2012, 8:04 PM),
http://volokh.com/2010/09/27/ineffective-law-porn/.
81. See Robert Morse & Sam Flanigan, Methodology: Law School Rankings, U.S. NEws &
WORLD REP. (Mar. 12, 2012), http://www.usnews.com/education/best-graduate-schools/top-
law-schools/arficles/2012/03/12/methodology-law-school-rankings (explaining the method-
ology employed in the rankings). Expenditures per student account for just under 10
percent of a school's overall ranking. Student-faculty ratio accounts for another 3 percent,
while the total number of books in the law library accounts for three-quarters of 1 percent. In
other words if School A and School B are identical in all respects except that School A spends
more money to achieve exactly the same results, School A will be ranked higher than School
B.
82. See infra Part III.
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to sit for the bar exam in the jurisdiction in which they wish to
practice? The answer to that question reveals the scope of the crisis
that is now overtaking American legal education.
PART III: CONSEQUENCES FOR RECENT GRADUATES
Law school now costs too much for two reasons: there aren't
enough jobs for lawyers, especially new lawyers, and too many of the
legal jobs that do exist do not pay enough to justify incurring the
cost of a legal education. This combination of circumstances is a
product of both long-term changes in the market for the providers
of legal services and the way law students finance their legal educa-
tion. The result has been the creation of a class of deeply indebted,
underemployed law school graduates.83 A common response of law
schools to this situation has been denial.8 4 But, as the extent of the
collapse in the market for new law graduates becomes apparent,
denial is slowly giving way to recognition. This section will first out-
line the employment and salary situation for recent law graduates.
It will then review some of the economic and social consequences
for those graduates of entering a hyper-saturated legal market while
carrying unprecedented levels of educational loan debt. Finally, it
will touch on the employment and under-employment situation for
recent graduates of the nation's elite law schools. 8
5
A. Employment and Salary Outcomes for Recent Law School Graduates
How many recent graduates of American law schools manage to
obtain real legal jobs? Of this group, how many are able to make
enough money from the practice of law to justify the cost of ob-
taining a law degree? Answering these questions requires looking
critically at the statistics reported by law schools to the National As-
sociation for Law Placement (NALP) and the American Bar
83. For a stark glimpse into the world of marginalized lawyers and law graduates, see
Law Forum, JD UNDERGROUND, http://www.jdunderground.com/all/ (last visited Aug. 30,
2012).
84. For instance, a literature search through LexisNexis reveals that the phrase "law
graduate debt" occurs in exactly one law review article published in the last five years, and
that the relationship between student debt and the cost of law school has gotten almost no
attention in the legal academic literature to this point.
85. The situation for elite law school graduates is particularly telling, because if signifi-
cant numbers of such graduates are having trouble securing acceptable employment out-
comes, this has dire implications for law school graduates as a whole-the vast majority of
whom, of course, do not attend elite schools.
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Association (ABA). These statistics have many limitations, perhaps
the most glaring of which is that they provide no information on
what law school graduates are doing even two years after gradua-
tion, let alone further down the line. 6 Instead, they provide a snap-
shot of what the members of a national graduating class are doing
nine months after completing law school. To answer the question
of how good of a return graduates are getting on their investment,
we would need much better data than we have regarding medium-
and long-term career outcomes. Still, even with their limitations,
the NALP and ABA data can be analyzed in useful ways.
My analysis is based on the following heuristic: a real legal job
consists of full-time, non-temporary employment that requires a law
degree. The economic value of a law degree is largely a product of
the fact that a law degree from an ABA-accredited law school is a
prerequisite for admission to the bar in the vast majority of Ameri-
can jurisdictions. Although some law graduates will acquire jobs for
which a law degree was not required, but which still added marginal
value to the applicant's resume, this category appears to include a
small percentage of all law graduates."7 A law degree can impede
acquiring non-legal jobs. 8 Indeed, even aside from the cost of ac-
quiring a law degree, it is unclear whether the degree benefits, on
average, those graduates who do not acquire legal jobs. Similarly, it
is safe to assume that very few people spend $150,000 to $250,000 in
order to qualify for part-time or temporary work.
These principles permit a basic estimate of the core employment
rate-that is, the percentage of law graduates who had real legal
jobs nine months after graduation-for the national law school
class of 2011 (the most recent year for which national statistics are
available). We can then compare those numbers to those of na-
tional classes over the previous decade, before taking a generation-
long perspective, in an attempt to discern what changes are
happening in the market for the providers of legal services.
In June 2012, NALP reported that 60 percent of 2011 graduates
whose employment status was known nine months after graduation
86. A glimpse of what is happening to the long-term earning potential of attorneys is
provided by a survey conducted by the Alabama Bar Association, which reveals that the per-
centage of attorneys in the state making at least $200,000 and $100,000 per year (in 2009
dollars) fell by half between 1985 and 2009, and that 23 percent of attorneys with active
licenses were making less than $25,000 in 2009. See ALA. SrATE BAR, ECONOUC SURVEY Of
IAwvaRs IN ALABAMA (2010), available at http://www.alabar.org/media/news/images/0404
2012_Economic-SurveyofLawyersinAlabama20i0Report.pdf.
87. See generally NALP Class of 2010 Graduate Salary Data, ABA SECTION ON LEGAL EDUC.,
http://employmentsummary.abaquestionnaire.org/nalp.aspx (last visited Nov. 8, 2012).
88. See, e.g., Elie Mystal, What 'Can't' You Do with a Law Degree?, ABovETHELAw (Jan. 19,
2012), http://abovethelaw.com/2012/01/what-cant-you-do-witha-law-degree/.
[VOL. 46:1
The Crisis of the American Law School
were working in full-time positions requiring bar admission.89 (The
employment status of approximately 7 percent of graduates re-
mained unknown.)90 Shortly thereafter, the ABA, bowing to pres-
sure to make more data on employment outcomes public, released
detailed data for the class of 2011. 91 These data revealed that nine
months after graduation, only 55.2 percent of graduates whose em-
ployment status was known were employed in full-time, long-term
positions requiring bar admission. 92
Yet these figures only begin to tell the story of the extent to
which recent law school graduates are struggling. Consider some of
the types of jobs that the NALP and ABA surveys count as part of
the core employment rate, that is, full-time, long-term employment
requiring a law degree:
(1) Clerkships. Judicial clerkships make up an ambiguous cate-
gory of post-graduation outcomes. Traditionally, Article
III clerkships have been considered a prestigious waysta-
tion on the road to more permanent employment. On the
other end of the spectrum, state district court clerkships
tend to be truly temporary positions, which leave those in
them scrambling to find legal work afterwards. At all but a
few schools, the large majority of judicial clerkships are
state and local rather than federal, and the majority of
state clerkships are with district courts.93 Categorizing the
latter as long-term positions is both unrealistic and
misleading.
(2) Positions funded by law schools. Another particularly notable
subcategory of dubious "long-term" positions comprises
those funded by law schools themselves, which provided
some of their otherwise unemployed graduates with "full-
time, long-term employment requiring bar admission dur-
ing the NALP nine-month, post-graduation reporting
period." The June 2012 ABA data reveals that this practice
is becoming quite common, particularly at many of the
89. See NAT'L ASS'N FOR LAW PLACEMENT, EMPLOYMENT FOR THE CLASS OF 2011-SE-
LECTED FINDINGS 3 (2012), available at http://www.nalp.org/uploads/Classof2011Selected
Findings.pdf.
90. Id.
91. See Employment Summary Report, A.B.A. SEC. OF L GAL EDUC., http://
employmentsummary.abaquestionnaire.org/ (last visited Aug. 30, 2012).
92. "Long-term" employment in this data set is defined as all employment that does not
have a definite term of employment of less than one year.
93. For example, 22 of the 29 graduates of the University of Colorado's 2011 class who
obtained judicial clerkships were in state and local positions, and 15 of the latter were in
district rather than appellate court positions (data on file with the author).
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highest-ranked schools. In addition, many schools funded
short-term jobs-positions lasting less than one year-for
their graduates.
The following high-ranked schools funded a significant
number of what the schools reported as long-term, full-
time, bar-admission-required jobs held by their 2011 grad-
uates nine months after graduation:
* Yale: 22 of 205 graduates
* Harvard: 33 of 583 graduates
" Columbia: 38 of 456 graduates
* Chicago: 24 of 203 graduates
* NYU: 56 of 466 graduates
* Virginia: 64 of 377 graduates
* George Washington: 80 of 518 graduates94
Several other high-ranked schools, by contrast, funded
large numbers of what the schools reported as short-term,
full-time; short-term, part-time; or long-term, part-time po-
sitions requiring bar admission for graduates, which those
graduates held as of February 15, 2012. These jobs thus
improved the schools' overall nine-month after-
graduation employment rate but not the schools' core em-
ployment rate, which includes only full-time, "long-term,"
bar-required positions. Schools with these sorts of posi-
tions include:
* Cornell: 26 of 201 graduates held short-term, full-time,
law school-funded jobs;
" Georgetown: 58 of 644 graduates were in short-term,
full-time, law school-funded jobs, while 19 were in
long-term, full-time, law school-funded positions;
* UCLA: 55 short-term, part-time positions, eight short-
term, full-time positions, and one long-term, full-time
position out of 344 graduates;
" Vanderbilt: 31 long-term, part-time positions out of
198 graduates;
* Notre Dame: 41 short-term, full-time positions and two
long-term, full-time positions out of 190 graduates;
" Boston University: 50 short-term, part-time and 10
short-term, full-time positions out of 273 graduates;
94. See supra note 91.
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Fordham: 41 part-time, short-term, 12 full-time, short-
term, and 4 full-time, long-term law school-funded po-
sitions out of 428 graduates.
95
While such programs can be defended as attempts to deal
with the genuine employment crisis facing graduates, they
can also be criticized as attempts to game a school's over-
all graduate employment rate. This applies especially to
programs whose existence was not revealed before the re-
lease of the ABA data.
(3) Jobs that feature nominal or non-existent salaries. Recently sev-
eral U.S. Attorney offices around the country made news
in the legal press by offering the opportunity to work in
year-long Special Assistant U.S. Attorney positions. It
turned out that the word "Special" in the job title referred
to the fact that these full-time positions, which required
applicants to have at the very least a law degree and bar
membership, were completely unpaid.96
This is merely a particularly striking example of a practice
that has arisen among government and non-profit organi-
zations, employers that can avoid the legal requirement to
pay employees at least what would otherwise be the legal
minimum wage. With law schools churning out tens of
thousands of un- or under-employed graduates every year,
employers are discovering that it is becoming possible to
hire employees to perform full-time legal work without ac-
tually paying them for it. How widespread this practice is
remains unknown, but the large number of graduates who
report they are doing "internships" and "clerkships" for
employers suggests that this innovation in legal employer-
employee relations may not be rare.
(4) Unsustainable self-employment. The fourth category com-
prises possibly unsustainable forms of self-employment.
42.9 percent of 2011 graduates who listed themselves as
employed by firms were with firms of two to ten attorneys,
while another 6 percent described themselves as in solo
95. See id.
96. See Special Assistant United States Attorney, U.S. DrP'T oF JUMtICE, http://wwwjustfce
.gov/oarm/jobs/llwdvasausa-Olan.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2012). Remarkably, one such
position required at least three and preferably five years of practice experience. See also Chris-
topher Danzig, The DOJ Wants You, Experienced Attorneys-to Work for Free, ABOVE THE L. (an.
26, 2012, 12:20 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/tag/special-assistant-united-states-attorney/.
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practice. 97 Some of the former jobs were genuine, if gen-
erally low-paying, associate positions with stable law firms.
Others consisted of nominally paid "clerkships" or so-
called eat-what-you-kill arrangements, in which a firm
offers office space to a graduate in return for a percentage
of whatever business the graduate manages to drum up.
Yet others consisted of a couple of new grads opening a
law office and trying to make a go of it, in a hyper-satu-
rated market in which they likely have almost no idea what
they are doing, because neither the most basic mechanics
of practicing law nor any of the aspects of running one's
own small business were covered during the course of
their legal education.9 8 (These disadvantages apply with
special force to the approximately 1,059 members of the
class of 2011 who attempted to start solo practices.)
If we eliminate state district court clerkships and law school-
funded positions from the core employment rate made up of those
holding full-time long-term jobs requiring bar passage, then the
percentage of graduates of the class of 2011 who can be said to have
held real legal jobs nine months after graduation falls well below 50
percent.99 We can only speculate regarding how many full-time, pu-
tatively long-term positions feature either nominal or non-existent
salaries or otherwise consist of forms of unsustainable self-employ-
ment. It seems doubtful, though, that when all is said and done,
much more than one-third of the graduates of ABA-accredited law
schools in 2011 had what we are defining-and, more to the point,
what they would have considered from an ex ante perspective-as
real legal jobs. 100
We have not yet touched on what must be a crucial consideration
in any analysis of this type, which is how much the salaried lawjobs
that do exist after law school actually pay. Here, the NALP data are
seriously incomplete, but in a way that nevertheless allows us to
draw certain conclusions regarding the data NALP reported, which
97. See NAT'L ASS'N FOR LAw PLACEMENT, supra note 89.
98. The percentage of very small firm jobs listed by recent graduates fall into each of
these categories remains unknown. That some graduates fall into each is clear from my ex-
tensive correspondence with recent graduates regarding their employment situations.
99. Only 58 percent of 2010 ABA law school graduates had a full-time position requiring
a law degree nine months after graduation. But 26 percent of all jobs taken by these gradu-
ates (including non-legal jobs) were temporary positions. See supra note 89.
100. To put it another way, a real legal job can be defined as ajob that a typical prospec-
tive law student would have considered a minimally satisfactory employment outcome as a
consequence of the decision to enroll in law school.
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covers only 41.9 percent of the class of 2011.101 The significance of
the missing data can be gleaned by examining the widely varying
reporting rates for different job categories. For example, salaries
were reported for 93.2 percent of graduates who reported employ-
ment with firms of more than 500 attorneys.1 02 Meanwhile salaries
were reported for just 40.7 percent of graduates who reported em-
ployment with firms of two to ten attorneys. And naturally no sala-
ries were reported for the 14.3 percent of the class that was not
employed at all. In short, reporting rates tended to be very high for
graduates with high-paying work and low for graduates with low-
paying jobs.103
Given this pattern, one can draw certain fairly reliable conclu-
sions about the salaries graduates of the class of 2011 received nine
months into their nascent legal careers. NALP reported a median
salary of $60,000 for the 41.9 percent of graduates of the class for
whom it had salary data. This means that 20.95 percent of the class
was reported to be making a salary of $60,000 or more. The true
figure is probably higher, but how much higher?10 4 Because salary
reporting rates are so much higher among graduates with well-pay-
ing jobs, it seems improbable that more than one quarter of the
class of 2011 was making $60,000 or more nine months after gradu-
ation. This conclusion can also be extrapolated from the so-called
bimodal salary distribution in salaries paid to recent law graduates.
As Professor William Henderson's analysis of the data indicates,
there are actually very few entry-level legal jobs that pay moderately
more than the median reported salary. 10 5 A very large number of
entry-level legal jobs pay between $35,000 and $60,000 per year,
101. See NAT'L ASS'N FOR LAw PLACEMENT, supra note 89.
102. See id.
103. When reporting salaries, schools do not rely solely on self-reporting by graduates.
NALP encourages schools to use a variety of sources of information, such as publicly known
starting salaries at law firms and other employers, to determine graduates' salaries when
these are not reported by the graduates themselves. One consequence of this is that a gradu-
ate with a high-paying job is far more likely to have his or her salary recorded even without
the graduate's cooperation.
104. "Probably," because it isn't completely clear that the number of unreported salaries
of $63,000 or more outnumbers the number of misreported salaries that were reported as
being this high but in fact were not. When I audited the employment and salary data for the
University of Colorado's class of 2010, I found several inaccuracies in regard to employment
status that all tended to overstate the graduate's employment situation. That is, I found grad-
uates who were working part-time described as working full-time, and graduates in short-term
positions described as being in long-term positions. I was unable to check the accuracy of
reported salary data.
105. See William Henderson, Distribution of 2006 Starting Salaries: Best Graphic Chart of the
Year, EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. (Sept. 4, 2007, 3:29 PM), http://www.elsblog.org/the empirical
_legal-studi/2007/09/distribution-ofhtml.
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while a smaller number pay the six-figure salaries that big firms of-
fer to starting associates. We know the reporting rates for six-figure
salaries are very high, and that there are comparatively fewjobs that
pay in the high five figures. In short, it seems unlikely that many
graduates are making more than the reported median but having
their salaries go unreported.
10 6
Roughly speaking, we can estimate that perhaps 15 percent of
contemporary law graduates are securing high-paying, entry-level le-
gal jobs, and another 25 percent are getting legal jobs that pay in
the mid five figures, while a solid majority of graduates are unable
to secure full-time, genuinely long-term legal employment within a
year of graduation. The consequences for recent graduates of this
overall employment and salary situation, given the skyrocketing cost
of obtaining a law degree, are dire.
B. Debts that No Honest Man Can Pay
Nearly nine out of ten current law students borrow money to at-
tend law school. 10 7 Two years ago, the federal government
revamped federal support for educational lending by removing gov-
ernment guarantees for private educational loans and replacing
such loans with a system of expanded direct lending from the fed-
eral government. Federal loans to attend law school currently carry
interest rates of 6.8 percent for the first $20,500 borrowed per year,
and 7.9 percent for any amount beyond that."0 8 Unlike almost any
other form of debt, educational loans are nearly impossible to dis-
charge in bankruptcy.10 9 What this means, in practice, is that Ameri-
can taxpayers are now the direct guarantors of the approximately
106. This is all the more true given the very strong practical incentives law schools have to
discover and report all the high-salaried jobs their graduates have acquired. Of course the
incentives run very much the other way with regard to discovering and reporting low salaries.
107. The percentage of 2008 law school graduates who took out educational loans to pay
law school expenses was 88.6 percent. SeeJULIE MARGETrA MORGAN, CENTER FOR AM. PRO-
GRESS, What Can We Learn from Law School? 8 (2011), available at http://www.american
progress.org/issues/2011/12/pdf/legal-education.pdf.
108. See GradPlus Loan for Grad Students, GRAILoANs.coM, http://www.gradloans.com/
graduate-plus-loan/ (last visited Aug. 11, 2012); Graduate Stafford Student Loans,
GRAInLoANs.cOM, http://www.gradloans.com/staffordloan/ (last visited Aug. 11, 2012).
109. See Madeleine Patton & Brandon Howard, Student Gallery, Reducing the Life Sentence
of Student Loans, 31 AM. BANKR. INST.J. 48, 48 (2012) (noting that over the past two decades,
student loans have become "nearly impossible to discharge in bankruptcy," subject to a nar-
rowly construed hardship exception).
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$4.375 billion per year of relatively high-interest federal debt that
law students borrow to attend law school.l 0
How much is this per graduate? The median law school-related
debt for indebted graduates of the 191 law schools who reported
data for the class of 2011 (four schools did not report) was
$105,028, a 5.84 percent increase from 2010's figure of $99,236.111
This happens to be almost exactly the percentage by which tuition
went up for the national class of 2011 relative to the class of 2010,
and indicates the extent to which law school tuition is now so high
that tuition increases will be close to 100 percent debt-financed by
the nearly 90 percent of graduates who take on law school debt."
12
Note that these figures do not include interest accrued on these loans.
Interest accrues on educational loans from the date of issue, and
this has a significant effect on the borrower's loan balance. Indeed,
if a student does not pay down interest accrued on law school loans
over the course of law school, then a student who borrows $125,000
in principal (this was the average borrowed by 2011 graduates of
private law schools) will have a $142,500 loan balance six months
after graduation, when the first loan payment comes due. This in
turn suggests that the published data on law school debt understate
the true levels by close to 15 percent.
Keep in mind that these figures omit other educational debt. As
far as I have been able to discover, most law schools do not collect
any data on how much educational debt the students they admit
have already incurred, but average undergraduate debt among col-
lege graduates with debt is estimated to have been nearly $25,000 in
2011.' '3 Although this figure omits the typically higher debt loads of
graduates of increasingly common for-profit colleges, it is likely that
the vast majority of law schools featured median educational debt
for 2011 graduates well into six figures. 1 4 Furthermore, given ongo-
ing law school tuition increases, current law students are certain to
incur significantly more debt than the graduating class of 2011.
110. Approximately 125,000 law students are currently borrowing an average of about
$35,000 per year to attend ABA-accredited law schools. The average amount borrowed and
the total number of students are extrapolated from the 2011 ABA graduate debt data pub-
lished by U.S. News & World Report. See infra note 111.
111. See Whose Graduates Have the Most Debt?, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., http://grad-
schools.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/bestgradiate-schools/top-law-schools/grad-debt-
rankings (last visited Aug. 30, 2012).
112. See Matt Leichter, The Law School Tuition Bubble: Tuition increases Law School-by-Law
School from 2005 to 2011, Part 1, THE L. SCH. TUITION BUBBLE (Jan. 24, 2011), http://
lawschooltuitionbubble.wordpress.com/2011/01 / 24/the-law-school-tuition-bubble-tuition-
increasesaw-school-by-law-school-from-2005-to-201 1-part-l/.
113. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
114. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
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Even if tuition were frozen at all law schools in 2012 and 2013, cur-
rent ILs would still pay on average about $22,000 more in total tui-
tion than did the class of 2011.115 Indeed, we can estimate
conservatively that the average law student in the graduating class
of 2014 who graduates with educational debt will have approxi-
mately $165,000 of such debt-almost all of it at interest rates be-
tween 6.8 and 7.9 percent.
Servicing this sort of debt requires a fairly high income. A ten-
year repayment plan on a $150,000 loan balance will require pay-
ments of $1774 per month, i.e., more than $21,000 per year. This
will almost surely be an impossible debt burden for the 75 to 80
percent of current law graduates who will be earning below the
"median" NALP-reported salary of $60,000 pre-tax dollars, except
for those who are getting significant financial help from a spouse or
other family members.'1 6 Those who are earning near the high end
of this range may be able to pay off their educational debt in a
legally timely manner by refinancing their loans to twenty-five-year
terms, which is becoming a common practice among law graduates.
Even so, they will still be dealing with a monthly payment of
$1,100-and total payments, with interest, of $330,000, which many
will not have completed when their own children are in college."1
7
And even a twenty-five-year repayment plan will be of no use to the
large number of recent graduates making considerably less than
mid-five figure salaries, or who are completely unemployed. Nor
will it be useful to those making the "median" (in reality the sev-
enty-fifth to eightieth percentile) salary but who have $200,000,
$250,000, or even $300,000 in educational debt, as thousands do
now, and even more will in the near future.
Even for the "winners" in the law school investment game-the
approximately 15 percent of law students who acquire jobs upon
graduation that pay six-figure starting salaries-that game remains
fraught with financial peril. Few graduates who join big law firms
115. This number can be derived by comparing tuition levels in 2011-2012 to those over
the previous three years and assuming that tuition remains the same for the class of 2014 for
the duration of its members' law school attendance.
116. Recall that the median salary as reported by NALP is drawn from a group that in-
cludes only 41.9 percent of all law graduates, meaning that barely one in five law graduates
were reported to have salaries at or above the median.
117. See Beta Georgetown Law Prospective Student Financial Planning Calculator, GEORGETOWN
LAw, http://www.law.georgetown.edu/admissions-financial-aid/office-of-financial-aid/
loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&pageid=61621 (last visited Oct. 1, 2012) (providing a
useful tool for calculating the consequences of various debt levels). This calculator illustrates
how fully debt-financing a legal education will result in debt loads, six months after gradua-
tion, nearly 20 percent higher than the principal debt incurred over the course of law school.
For example a student who borrows $200,000 over the course of law school will have, at
present interest rates, around $234,000 in debt in the fall following graduation.
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become partners.1 18 If they acquire reasonably high-paying posi-
tions upon departure, or if they live very frugally during their years
with the firm and manage to pay down a large portion of their debt,
then their gamble will have paid off, at least in pecuniary terms. 119
Yet changes in the market for such high-paying big firm positions
appear to be making this an increasingly risky wager-not merely in
terms of acquiring such a job in the first place but also in terms of
holding onto it long enough or having a good enough exit option,
or both, to make the initial acquisition ultimately worthwhile. 120 In-
deed, a pair of recent papers by law professors-one of whom is
currently a law school dean-conclude that a law degree is, under
present circumstances, likely to be a significantly negative net in-
vestment for a large majority of those who acquire one.
121
Those law school graduates-quite possibly an actual majority-
who cannot pay their debts in a timely manner, even if those debts
were refinanced to traditional mortgage-length terms, are faced
with few options. Except under extraordinary circumstances, their
debts cannot be discharged in bankruptcy, which means they will
either eventually default on them or, if they are eligible, enter the
federal government's Income-Based Repayment program (IBR).
IBR allows debtors to make reduced payments equal to 15 percent
of whatever portion of their adjusted gross income is 150 percent
above the federal poverty line.12 2 Interest due that is not paid by the
debtor accrues but is not capitalized. After twenty-five years
123 -
118. According to NALP, 77 percent of associates leave the firm they joined after gradua-
tion within five years. See Law Practice: Up, Out or Over, A.B.A. L. PRac, ARcHnvE, #160
(2006-2010).
119. The non-pecuniary (i.e., psychic) benefits and costs of legal education comprise a
subject beyond the scope of this Article. Suffice it to say that this is a complex topic, as it
seems clear that such benefits and costs are both considerable. On the one hand a legal
career has significant status value for many people beyond its monetary rewards; on the
other, both the monetary rewards and status value must be weighed against the body of
evidence suggesting that lawyers are unusually unhappy, depressed, and prone to substance
abuse and suicide when compared to other professionals. On the latter set of issues, see
Patrick Schiltz, On Being a Happy, Healthy, and Ethical Member of an Unhappy, Unhealthy, and
Unethical Profession, 52 VMJO. L. Rav. 871, 874-81 (1999).
120. Some observers believe that the recent downturn in big-firm hiring is a sign of a
structural rather than a cyclical change in the employment market for lawyers, and that both
law firms and law schools need to accommodate themselves to a world in which technology
and outsourcing will continue to transfer work that was formerly done byjunior associates at
large American law firms to other, more economical entities.
121. SeeJim Chen, A Degree of Practical Wisdom: The Ratio of Educational Debt to Income as a
Basic Measurement of Law School Graduates' Economic Viability, 38 WM. MITCHFlL L. Rr.v. 1185
(2012); HerwigJ. Schlunk, Mamas 2011: Is a Law Degree a Good Investment Today? (Vand. Law
& Econ., Working Paper No. 11-42, 2011).
122. See Federal Student Aid, U.S. DEP'T OF EDuc., http://studentaid.ed.gov/PORTALS
WebApp/students/english/IBRPlan.jsp (last visited Aug. 30, 2012).
123. See id.
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twenty years for loans originating after 2012 124-any remaining
principal is forgiven, although under present IRS rules the forgiven
debt is treated as income to the debtor. 25 For certain government
loans, the Public Service Loan Forgiveness Program (PSLF) allows a
debtor's debt to be discharged after 120 on-time reduced rate pay-
ments if the debtor is working for a government or non-profit
employer.126
While preferable to default, the disadvantages of IBR and PSLF
are significant. The debtor's debt grows for as long as the debtor
remains eligible. This means that the debtor has a large unsecured
debt on his or her credit report, which will make it difficult to ob-
tain consumer credit. If the debtor secures a high enough-paying
job to no longer be eligible for IBR, the debtor must start making
payments on the whole amount. Most problematic of all, the IBR
program creates no contractual rights for those who take advantage
of it: as a legal matter the program could be eliminated at any time,
leaving those dependent on it with enormous amounts of non-dis-
chargeable debt.
In sum, the present cost of legal education creates debt loads for
law students that bear no reasonable relation to the employment
prospects many of those students will have upon graduation. And
this is no longer merely a problem at lower-ranked law schools. The
combination of increasing educational costs and flat or actually de-
creasing numbers of high-paying legal jobs, in an economy where
the cost of legal services is coming under more and more pressure
from the forces of economic rationalization, has created a situation
in which many graduates of even very highly ranked schools find
themselves struggling to secure the kinds of jobs they would have
considered minimally acceptable when they enrolled. (Keep in
mind that such people often paid $200,000 or more in direct costs,
as well as incurring significant opportunity costs, to obtain law de-
grees from prestigious institutions).
124. See We Can't Wait: Obama Administration to Lower Student Loan Payments for Millions of
Borrower, THE WHrrE HousE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/10/25/we-
can t-wait-obarna-administration-lower-student-loan-payments-millions-b (last visited Nov. 18,
2012).
125. See, e.g., 1,NTERNAI. REVENUE SERV., 2008 REPORT TO CONGRESS 391 (2009), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/O8-tas arcIr_6.pdf.
126. See Public Service Loan Forgiveness, FEDERAL STUDENT AID, http://
www.studentaid.ed.gov/repay-loans/forgiveness-cancellation/charts/public-service (last vis-
ited Nov. 18, 2012).
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C. Current Employment Outcomes for Graduates of Elite Law Schools
How many current students at highly-ranked law schools are
likely to secure what they would have considered a good, or at least
acceptable, first legal job upon graduation before they enrolled?
12 7
One way to answer this question is to determine outcomes that pro-
spective elite law school students would likely consider unaccept-
able from an ex ante perspective. Although, of course, these will
vary by individual, it is possible to make general estimates about the
sorts of post-graduate outcomes that would lead to buyer's remorse
on the part of people who are considering investing several hun-
dred thousand dollars in direct and opportunity costs in order to
attend a top law school.
For the purpose of analysis, let us assume the following post-grad-
uate outcomes, as recorded by the annual NALP survey, would be
considered unacceptable by most prospective elite law school
students:
(1) Unemployment (or employment status not known);
(2) A law school-funded position;
(3) Further graduate study;
(4) Academia;
(5) A position with a very small law firm (ten or fewer attor-
neys) or as a solo practitioner;
(6) A state or local clerkship; and
(7) A position in "business and industry."
That (1) and (2) are generally bad outcomes requires no expla-
nation. Further graduate study-which most often means enroll-
ment in an LL.M. program-is, for law school graduates, often a
consequence of being unable to obtain suitable employment, On
NALP forms, "academia" tends to mean a low-paying and generally
temporary position within an academic institution, rather than a
tenure-track job, or a so-called visiting assistant professorship,
which can serve as a prelude to the former.1 28 Positions with very
small law firms generally feature most of the major disadvantages of
entry-level associate big firm work, such as long hours and boring
127. For many graduates, the first job they acquire after graduation plays a particularly
significant role in their overall career path, since certain types of prestigious legal work (for
example, employment with a national law firm or a federal judicial clerkship) tend to have a
strong effect on a graduate's subsequent career prospects.
128. To minimize the possibility of double-counting undesirable outcomes, I am assum-
ing all jobs listed under "academia" are law school-funded positions.
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tasks, without the compensation of a large paycheck. 129 State and
local clerkships are rarely considered desirable positions by elite law
school graduates, who appear to have only begun taking such posi-
tions recently. On NALP surveys, "business and industry" usually sig-
nifies, with occasional exceptions, low-paying non-legal
employment.
130
Of course all these generalizations are subject to individual ex-
ceptions. For example, a graduate is occasionally unemployed by
choice. Some small law firm jobs are with high-paying boutiques. A
state appellate court clerkship can be a desirable position. A posi-
tion in "business and industry" might feature a six-figure salary with
an international consulting firm. On the other hand, the proposed
method of analysis assumes that all jobs with firms of more than ten
attorneys, all federal clerkships, all government jobs, and all public
interest positions are without exception desirable outcomes for
graduates, which will also not be true in some individual cases. The
point of the method is not to make individual judgments but to
provide a basic estimate in the aggregate regarding the present like-
lihood of desirable and undesirable outcomes for graduates of
these schools.
Based on the above definitions, here are estimates of what per-
centage of the graduating classes of 2011 at the nation's twenty
highest-ranked law schools had undesirable employment outcomes
as of February 15, 2012:131
* Yale: 18.4 percent
129. The median salary for 2011 graduates who joined such firms and reported their
salaries was $50,000 (among firms with two to ten attorneys). The true median was probably
quite a bit lower, as only 40 percent of such graduates reported a salary. See Class of 2011
National Summary Report, NAT'L Assoc. OF L. PLACEMENT (July 2012), http://www.nalp.org/
uploads/natlsummchart-classol2O1 .pdf.
130. Because in a typical year approximately 3 percent of graduates of Yale, Stanford, and
Harvard Law Schools take high-paying "business and industry" positions with consulting firms
and the like, I am assuming that a similar proportion of the graduates of the other schools
listed here enjoyed desirable outcomes when they were listed as taking jobs in "business and
industry." For schools outside the very top tier, this is almost certainly an overly optimistic
estimate. (This 3 percent figure is an estimate based on the individual job placements for
people in business and industry reported by Harvard, Yale and Stanford law schools.)
131. For the purposes of this analysis, very small law firms are defined as firms of ten or
fewer attorneys. For example, Columbia lists 456 graduates in its 2011 class. Nine months
after graduation, eleven were unemployed or in graduate school. Thirty-eight were in law
school-funded jobs. Three were listed as being in academia, which I assume for the purpose
of analysis are law school-funded positions, and which I therefore did not add to the numera-
tor. Eight were with very small law firms, twenty-four were in business or industry (I am as-
suming fourteen of these positions-3 percent of 456-represented desirable outcomes),
and six had state or local clerkships. See Employment Statistics, COLUM. L. Scn., http://
ww.la.columbia.edu/careers/employment-statistics (last visited Nov. 8, 2012).
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" Stanford: 7.9 percent
* Harvard: 17.9 percent
* Columbia: 16.0 percent
* Chicago: 23.6 percent
* NYU: 23.6 percent
* Penn: 17.0 percent
* Berkeley: 19.2 percent
* Duke: 22.5 percent
" Michigan: 26.5 percent
" Virginia: 28.1 percent
* Northwestern: 22.8 percent
" Cornell: 28.8 percent
* Georgetown: 31.3 percent
" Vanderbilt: 34.9 percent
" Texas: 42.0 percent
* UCLA: 47.0 percent
" USC: 42.9 percent
" George Washington: 44.3 percent
* Minnesota: 66.3 percent
These statistics reflect the current situation for graduates of the
nation's highest-ranked law schools. They in turn suggest that, at
the ninety percent of ABA law schools ranked lower than those
listed above, a large majority of graduates are failing to obtain out-
comes that justify the direct and opportunity costs that graduates
incurred in the course of getting their law degrees. If this is indeed
the case, it follows that the current model of legal education in the
United States is on an unsustainable path, and that maintaining the
status quo is not a long-term option for legal academia.
PART IV: THE VALUE OF LAW DEGREES AND PROSPECTS FOR REFORM
Legal education in America now features costs that are not justi-
fied by the return on investment that law graduates can reasonably
expect from their degrees. This appears to be the case for a signifi-
cant majority of graduates at most law schools and large minorities
of graduates at even very elite institutions. 3 2 In other words, the net
present value of most law degrees being earned today is negative.
132. A common rule of thumb used by analysts of educational debt is that a degree that
requires the graduate to take on no more debt than the annual salary of the graduate's first
postgraduate job is a good investment, while a degree that requires 50 percent more debt is
problematic, and one which requires twice as much debt as the graduate's initial salary is
likely to be a poor investment. With average educational debt among law graduates now well
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What can be done to alter an equation that cannot be sustained
in the long run? This section examines the prospects for a signifi-
cant increase in the value of law degrees. It then considers some
short-term and longer-term reforms for dealing with the crisis of
the American law school.
A. Will Law Degrees Become More Valuable?
One possibility is that the return on investment graduates can
expect from law degrees will improve significantly. This seems un-
likely for a number of reasons. First, contrary to claims that what
appears to be the unsustainable cost structure of legal education is
only a temporary anomaly, produced by the downturn in large firm
entry-level hiring in the wake of the recession of 2007-2008, there is
a great deal of evidence that, for more than two decades now, long-
term structural changes in the market for the providers of legal ser-
vices have been eroding the expected return on law degrees. As a
percentage of gross domestic product, the legal services sector in
America has contracted by nearly one-third since the late 1970s. 3
These long-term changes were reflected in hiring statistics for new
law graduates well before the recent recession.
Here are the percentages of graduates of ABA-accredited law
schools who, according to the annual NALP survey, were employed
in full-time positions requiring a law degree nine months after
graduation in each year since 2001:
e 2001: 68.3 percent
* 2002: 67.0 percent
* 2003: 65.5 percent
* 2004: 65.1 percent
* 2005: 66.7 percent
* 2006: 68.3 percent
* 2007: 70.7 percent
* 2008: 67.2 percent
9 2009: 62.5 percent
* 2010: 59.9 percent
* 2011: 57.9 percent'3 4
into six figures, and no more than one in seven law graduates obtaining six-figure starting
salary jobs, very few law schools are currently producing even marginally acceptable out-
comes for their graduates.
133. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
134. See Employment Market for Law School Graduates Wavers, NAT'L ASs'N FOR LAW PLACE-
MENT (July 2010), http://www.nalp.org/julyl0trendsgradempl. Prior to 2001, NALP used a
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Note that these percentages include temporary positions, includ-
ing those positions created by law schools for their otherwise unem-
ployed graduates. 135 They also exclude from the denominator the
roughly 2 percent of students from each national class whose status
was unknown. In other words, even using an extremely generous
definition of what constitutes obtaining a legal job, fully one-third
of ABA law school graduates were not obtaining the jobs they had
hoped to receive on entering law school before the recent
recession.
Almost every long-term trend in the employment market for
graduates of American law schools points toward the elimination of
jobs, especially entry-level jobs for lawyers. Technology and out-
sourcing are the two most obvious structural factors that help ex-
plain a 33 percent functional unemployment rate among graduates
of ABA law schools, even before the recent downturn. 36 In
addition, the question of the extent to which large law firms will
return to something like the hiring patterns of five years ago,
though much discussed by the media and elite law schools, is
largely irrelevant to the vast majority of law school graduates. His-
torically speaking, 90 percent of law schools send less than 20 per-
cent of their graduates to such firms (and 80 percent of law schools
have a history of sending less than 10 percent of their graduates to
large firms).13
7
Further evidence that law degrees are unlikely to become more
valuable going forward can be found in the projections of the Bu-
reau for Labor Statistics (BLS), the federal agency charged with the
task of predicting likely demand in various industries in the coming
years. In its latest projections, the BLS predicts that there will be
approximately 801,800jobs for lawyers in America in 2020, up from
728,200 in 2010.138 The BLS sees the American economy adding
73,800 more legal jobs over the course of the present decade from
different method of calculation, which makes earlier figures not directly comparable. Note
that these are "nested" statistics, in that the percentage given for graduates employed in full-
time positions requiring a law degree is actually the percentage of the subset of graduates
who are employed nine months after graduation, not of all graduates. I have recalculated the
percentages to reflect the larger cohort.
135. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
136. For a perceptive analysis of these long-term trends, see RIcHARD SUSSKIND, THE END
OF LAWYERS? RETHINKING THE NATURE OF LEGAL SERVICES (2009).
137. It is true that the question of whether, for example, 73 percent (as in 2007) or 51.5
percent (as in 2011) of Columbia Law graduates are getting big firm jobs is of some relevance
to graduates of non-elite law schools, in that the lower number means such graduates will be
competing with many more graduates of elite law schools for non-elite positions.
138. These projections are based on what economists technically call "a full employment
economy" in the target year of 2020, which is to say an economy unaffected by any possible
recessionary effects at that point.
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the effects of economic growth, while the agency projects 138,400
currently existing jobs will be occupied not by the attorneys who
occupy them now but by people who are either not yet attorneys or
attorneys who at the beginning of the decade were not employed in
legal positions. 139 Overall, the BLS projects that 212,000 people who
did not have jobs as attorneys in 2010 will have such jobs in 2020.140
Consider what these numbers mean for law graduates. If we as-
sume that every legal job that becomes available per the BLS
projections between 2011 and 2020 that is not filled by an already-
employed lawyer is filled by people who graduate from ABA-
accredited law schools during those years, and if we further stipu-
late that the total number of graduates of such schools remains the
same on average over the course of the decade (approximately
44,500 per year), then we can project that 47.6 percent of graduates
of ABA-accredited law schools over the course of this decade will
get legal jobs.'4 ' This estimate is certainly too high, since some por-
tion of the 212,000 legal jobs that become available over the course
of the decade per the BLS projection will be filled by people who
graduated from law school prior to 2010 but were unemployed as
attorneys in 2010.142 An even more daunting projection is provided
by Matt Leichter, who has calculated the thirty-five-year degree
rate-that is, the total number of degrees conferred over the ap-
proximate length of a successful professional career-of ABA-ac-
credited law schools and compared it to the comparable rate for
accredited medical and dental schools. The results are startling:
Leichter finds that while the total number of degrees conferred
over the past thirty-five years by medical and dental schools closely
tracks the number of doctors and dentists currently working in the
United States according to Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) esti-
mates, the comparable ratio for law degrees and practicing attor-
neys is almost two to one.
43
139. See Employment Projections, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR (Mar. 29, 2012), http://bls.gov/
emp/.
140. See id.
141. This of course does not mean that 48 percent of law graduates will be employed
continuously as lawyers over this period. Assume that Associate A graduates in 2012, is hired
by a firm, is laid off in 2015, and is then replaced by Associate B, who graduated in 2015.
Assume further that Associate A does not get another legal job. Per the calculation method
we are employing here the "legal employment rate" for these two graduates over the course
of the decade was 100 percent, since both got legal jobs after not previously being employed
as attorneys at the beginning of the decade.
142. The assumption that ABA-accredited law schools will not expand over the course of
the decade may also be optimistic, given historical trends.
143. This method projects that by the end of the decade, the thirty-five-year degree con-
ferral total for ABA-accredited law schools will be slightly more than 1.6 million-exactly
twice the BLS projection regarding the total number of attorneys expected to be employed in
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In short, it would seem quite optimistic to predict that, assuming
anything like the status quo in American legal education is main-
tained, the expected economic value of law degrees will remain rel-
atively stable over the foreseeable future, as opposed to
deteriorating further.144 Expecting that value to grow seems
unrealistic.
B. Possible Responses to the Crisis of the American Law School
If the long-term value of a law degree can at best be expected to
remain stable, then the actual return on future law degrees can
only be improved by reducing the cost of obtaining such degrees. If
anything resembling the current system of legal education in
America is going to be sustainable as a long-term enterprise, then as
a matter of basic economics, the cost of becoming a lawyer within
that system must be reduced significantly. It is not going to be possi-
ble to continue to maintain a social system in which forty-five thou-
sand people are convinced every year to take on, and then allowed
by the American taxpayer to incur, an average of $150,000 of high-
interest, non-dischargeable educational debt in the pursuit of ap-
proximately twenty-one thousand legal jobs, 145 the majority of
which will not pay enough to allow graduates to fully service that
debt even over a long time horizon. The system might collapse be-
cause of reduced demand for law school admissions as potential law
students better understand the economics of legal education and
the legal profession, because the political system refuses to con-
tinue to provide unlimited debt-financing of educational creden-
tials that cost far more than they are worth, or, most likely, because
America at that time. See Matt Leichter, BLS Updates Its 2020 Employment Projections: For Law
Students, It's Very Bad, THE LAw SCH. TUITION BUBBLE (Mar. 3, 2012), http://awschooltuition
bubble.wordpress.com/2012/03/12/bls-updates-its-2020-employment-projections-for-law-
students-its-very-bad/. And it is worth noting that not all attorneys working in the United
States are graduates of ABA-accredited schools: unaccredited law schools produce several
thousand graduates every year, some of whom obtain legal jobs in those jurisdictions, most
notably California, that do not require a degree from an ABA-accredited school as a prereq-
uisite for taking the jurisdiction's bar examination. In addition, an unknown number of law-
yers trained outside of the United States practice within American jurisdictions.
144. It is sometimes argued that in an extremely complex, globalized economy, the de-
mand for legal services will rise. The difficulty with this line of argument is that it conflates
increasing demand for legal services with increasing demand for the services of new gradu-
ates of accredited American law schools. In sum, this is equivalent to someone in 1975
arguing that the sharply increasing global demand for automobiles over the next generation
would increase the demand for-and the wages of-members of the United Autoworkers
Union.
145. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
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of a combination of these factors. Ultimately the status quo cannot
be maintained. 46 1 will first consider reforms that could lead to the
preservation of the basic structure of much of the current system.
Then I will consider some more radical alternatives.
The most fundamental structural feature of the status quo in
American legal education is that aspiring lawyers must generally in-
vest in seven years of higher education in order to obtain a law li-
cense. 147 If that structure is to be maintained going forward, the
educational debt graduates incur must be reduced significantly,
while the long-term deterioration in the value of possessing a law
license must be at least be slowed, if not stopped or reversed. Ad-
vancing toward these goals is in no way a mysterious process: aver-
age law school tuition must be slashed at least to the levels of two or
three decades ago, while the number of graduates produced by
American law schools must be reduced significantly. Cutting tuition
does not require any sort of intellectual or technological break-
through; the factors that have driven tuition up so drastically are
both well understood and in no way unalterable. Reducing the
number of law school graduates is even less complex. It is becoming
obvious that a good number of the law schools that now exist in
America will need to close in the coming years, while quite a few
others will need to become a good deal smaller.
Tuition can be reduced drastically through the simple expedient
of returning to the cost structures that existed at law schools until
quite recently. Unless one wishes to defend the improbable pro-
position that the legal education received by the majority of attor-
neys practicing in America today was unacceptably inadequate,
there is no reason why student/faculty ratios at law schools cannot
be returned to the levels of thirty years ago. Nor is there any reason
to believe that legal academics must be paid twice as much in real
terms as they were a generation ago or that some dire consequence
would arise from expecting law professors to teach five classes per
146. In this regard, it is perhaps noteworthy that in his 2012 State of the Union address,
President Obama "put colleges and universities on notice" that they risked losing access to
federal loan money if they continued to raise tuition rates. See Kayla Webley, Obama Wants to
Force Colleges to Reduce Tuition, But at What Cost?, TIME SWAMPLAND (Jan. 30, 2012), http://
swampland.time.com/2012/01/30/obama-wants-to-force-colleges-to-reduce-tuition-but-at-
what-cost/.
147. From a comparative legal perspective, this is a highly unusual requirement. In the
vast majority of legal systems, including the vast majority of legal systems in the developed
world, becoming eligible to practice law requires far less formal education. See infra note 161.
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year rather than three.148 In addition, the ABA's accreditation re-
gime needs to be relaxed to allow schools to employ larger num-
bers of adjunct faculty, given that competent adjunct faculty serve
the valuable role of holding educational costs down, while convey-
ing useful information to law students regarding the actual practice
of law.
149
Significant reductions in the size of tenure-track faculties should
be accompanied by similar reductions in the size of administrative
staffs, which have grown at a much faster rate than faculties over
the course of the last generation.150 Again, there is no reason why
faculty cannot resume most if not all of the administrative duties
that have been outsourced in recent years to staff, in the name of
increasing the number of law review articles published every year.
The expenses associated with clinical legal education can be re-
duced through greater use of well-designed externship programs,
which allow students to obtain many of the same benefits at a radi-
cally reduced cost.
Many other opportunities for cost savings with little or no sacri-
fice of educational quality will likely present themselves in a world
in which law schools face a choice between reducing their expendi-
tures and ceasing to exist. As legal practice continues to move away
from requiring lawyers to consult books of any sort, the millions of
dollars per year that the typical law school expends on maintaining
a comprehensive law library could be reduced to a more rational
level of expenditure. Indeed, avoiding further wasteful expendi-
tures on luxurious physical plant upgrades, which have had little
function beyond allowing legal academia to consume conspicuously
in the context of a negative-sum reputational ratings game, would
itself save law schools vast sums of money.15 1 Similarly, as it becomes
evident that the current cost structure of legal education is unsus-
tainable, the central administrations of universities will necessarily
148. It is true this might lead to a reduction of the rate of legal academic publication to
that which existed a generation ago. Whether a radical reduction in the cost of legal educa-
tion ought to be purchased at the cost of seeing only five thousand law review articles pub-
lished per year, rather than the ten thousand being published at present, is a question that
does not, under the circumstances, seem too difficult to answer.
149. Under the current ABA rules, there is nothing barring a school from employing a
tenure track faculty made up exclusively of people who have never practiced law, or indeed
even obtained law degrees (several dozen current faculty at elite law schools do not have law
degrees of any kind), but there are strict limits regarding the number of practicing lawyers
who will be allowed to teach law school classes.
150. See supra notes 21-66 and accompanying text.
151. Many of these reforms are applicable to undergraduate education as well. Reducing
the cost of obtaining an undergraduate degree is a larger social reform that will, among
many other things, help rationalize the cost of postgraduate education.
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reduce the extent to which they treat law school tuition as a source
of revenue that cross-subsidizes other university programs.15-2
It is even possible that drastic cuts in the cost of legal education
will lend strength to arguments that this education is a public good,
which at least at public institutions ought to receive a higher mea-
sure of direct tax subsidization. Such arguments are far more likely
to succeed in the wake of genuine reform efforts than they are in
the current context of out-of-control expenditures, which have
been dedicated in no small part to making the lives of law profes-
sors and legal administrators more pleasant.
In sum, a series of straightforward reforms, undertaken over the
course of the next decade, could reduce the operational costs of
law school drastically to levels that would allow tuition to return to
where it was, in real terms, in the 1970s and 1980s.1, 3' This would be
a crucial step toward making the economic benefit of a legal educa-
tion once again reasonably relate to its cost.
Another crucial step depends on cultivating a widespread realiza-
tion that the cost of legal education is only part of the long-term
crisis facing the American legal profession. An equally key element
of that equation is that ABA-accredited law schools have for years
been graduating at least twice as many law students as there are
legal jobs for them. Returning American legal education to a sus-
tainable long-term model requires reducing that ratio. Given the
enormous surplus of graduates produced by ABA-accredited law
schools over the course of the last generation and the growth pros-
pects-or rather the lack of such prospects-for the legal profes-
sion over the course of the foreseeable future, it hardly seems
hyperbolic to suggest that such schools ought to be producing half
as many graduates as they currently do. As transparency increases
regarding the actual career outcomes obtained by law graduates in
recent years, and as the political system becomes increasingly aware
that taxpayers guarantee the cost of law degrees (which have nega-
tive economic value), some law schools seem certain to close while
others will become smaller.
154
152. The extent to which universities use law school revenues to cross-subsidize other
programs appears to vary radically between institutions. My own research indicates the pro-
portions range from as high as 45 percent to situations in which the central university actu-
ally subsidizes the law school.
153. It is true some of these reforms would be more difficult to implement quickly than
others. On the other hand, the pace of reform can be remarkably brisk under the right sort
of pressure. Cf SAMUEL JOHNSON, THE Coivicr's ADDRESS TO His UNRAPPY BRETHREN (1777)
("Depend upon it, sir, when a man knows he is to be hanged in a fortnight, it concentrates
his mind wonderfully.").
154. Many law graduates have discovered that, if they are unable to obtain jobs as attor-
neys, a law degree can have negative value even without regard to the direct costs involved in
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As painful as this outcome will be for many of the current em-
ployees of such schools, there can be little doubt that the net social
effect from the reduction of American law schools will be positive.
The current system produces, conservatively speaking, twenty thou-
sand to twenty-five thousand law graduates annually who will not be
able to service their educational debts. This system exists because of
the combined effects of social inertia and market distortions that
are produced by the continuing availability of loans that have no
reasonable prospect of being repaid in anything like a timely or
complete manner.
For those who wish to preserve something of the status quo in
legal education, a combination of greatly reduced operating costs
and significantly fewer law graduates offers the best hope for such
an outcome. No one can predict the extent to which the ongoing
crisis of the American legal profession will allow for a pace of re-
form that will maintain the current structure of legal education in
some significant part. If law schools slash their operating costs and
produce far fewer graduates, it might be the case that in a genera-
tion from now, a license to practice law will still require three years
of postgraduate attendance at institutions that resemble existing
schools. But the question whether this will happen differs from
whether this outcome represents the best road to reform.
The two main alternatives to a less expensive, smaller version of
the status quo are to either reduce the postgraduate component of
legal education in America or to eliminate it altogether. The first
approach would involve going back to a law school model that
predominated in much of America a century ago, when many law
schools offered two-year programs.1 55 This changed when the ABA
and the AALS waged a successful campaign to make the three-year
postgraduate model of legal education a legal prerequisite in al-
most all jurisdictions for bar admission.1 56 This campaign was waged
in the name of quality control but included significant elements of
class, ethnic, and religious bias. 15
7
In the subsequent decades, the three-year law school model
seems to have remained in place-like so many other aspects of
acquiring it. See, e.g., supra note 88. This is a product of the fact that a law degree can disqual-
ify applicants from jobs they could obtain prior to getting a law degree, as for a variety of
reasons, many non-legal employers are hesitant to hire law graduates. Indeed, this effect
applies not only to non-legal employers: former paralegals have discovered they can no
longer work in their former field after they have graduated from law school. See, e.g., J.D. to
Paralegal?, JD UNDERGROUND, http://www.jdunderground.com/paralegal/thread.php?
threadld=28082 (last visited Nov. 17, 2012).
155. See generally TAmANAHA, supra note 29.
156. See generally id.
157. See generally id.
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legal education in America-largely as a function of inertia, rather
than from any demonstration that the benefits of a third year of law
school justify its cost. Complaints from both law students and legal
educators that the third year is unnecessary have been common-
place since the earliest days of the requirement. 15 At a recent na-
tional conference on legal reform, no one among a group of more
than one hundred legal academics was willing to defend the
proposition that the third year of law school represented a justifia-
ble investment of time and money for contemporary law
students. 159
Given its dubious origins and its questionable cost/benefit ratio,
getting rid of the third year of law school would be a sensible altera-
tion of the legal academic status quo. Some schools are already
making de facto moves in this direction, such as replacing or
supplementing the third year classroom experience with one- or
two-semester externship programs that partially or completely
transform the third year into a quasi-apprenticeship experience.
The great advantage of such programs from the economic perspec-
tive of law schools is that they maintain a three-year tuition require-
ment even as they move toward eliminating the third year
classroom component entirely. Naturally, any meaningful reform in
this direction must eliminate the tuition requirement, not merely
the third classroom year.
Though such a reform would, holding everything else constant,
reduce both the direct cost and opportunity cost of law school by
one-third, it would also increase the rate at which law graduates
were being produced by a similar proportion. Thus, while reducing
law school by one year would be beneficial to new graduates in re-
gard to the upfront cost of becoming a lawyer, it would, all other
things being equal, have a marginally negative effect on the long-
term economic value of a law degree for both those graduates and,
more problematically, for lawyers who graduated under the old
three-year system.
A more radical reform would involve eliminating the postgradu-
ate education prerequisite for the practice of law altogether. There
is no inherent reason why a single institutional entity called "law
school" needs to be both a three-year extension of a college gradu-
ate's liberal education and a vocational training ground for future
158. See, e.g., Mitu Gulati, Richard Sander & Robert Socldoskie, The Happy Charade: An
Empirical Examination of the Third Year of Law Schoo4 51 J. LEGAL EDUC. 235, 242 (2001).
159. This question was posed to the audience at the opening session of the Future Ed
conference hosted jointly by Harvard Law School and New York Law School over three ses-
sions between the fall of 2010 and the fall of 2011.
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attorneys. This more comprehensive approach to reform assumes
that learning to think deeply about law is a skill and habit that fu-
ture lawyers should be given every chance to acquire as undergrad-
uate students studying law as a subject of concentration in a general
liberal arts degree program. It further assumes that postgraduate
legal education for future lawyers should consist of vocational train-
ing that takes place in explicitly vocational contexts such as super-
vised apprenticeship and externship programs.1 60 This resembles
the structure of legal education in just about every other country in
the world. 161
So where does this leave the various law schools that in recent
years have self-consciously adopted a graduate school model of edu-
cation with varying success? In the context of such a comprehensive
reform of American legal education, there would be room in both
the academic and legal hierarchy for a certain number of such
graduate schools of law. They would have two ongoing purposes:
training the next generation of legal academics 16 2 and providing a
mechanism for further social sorting, which could be employed by
those high-status legal institutions that wished to focus their hiring
efforts on people who had enough time and money to spend a
great deal of both pursuing formal education beyond their under-
graduate years.163 What such programs would not do is provide any-
thing that would be a prerequisite for acquiring a license to practice law.
Such a fundamental change in the structure of American legal
education is not likely to happen soon. On the other hand, the
160. For a recent proposal along these lines, co-authored by a Northwestern University
law professor and an attorney at the prominent firm of Kirkland & Ellis, see John 0. McGin-
nis c Russell Mangas, First Thing We Do, Let's Kill All the Law Schools, WAL. ST. J. (Jan. 17,
2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204632204577128443306853890
.html.
161. See Nuno Garoupa & Thomas S. Ulen, The Market for Legal Innovation: Law and Eco-
nomics in Europe and the United States, 59 ALA. L. REv. 1555, 1592 (2008) ("Except for a few
countries (apan and the Republic of Korea) that are currently revising their legal education
systems to look more like that in the United States, most lawyers in the world receive their
legal education by taking law as their undergraduate major.").
162. Almost all these graduate students will go on to teach in undergraduate programs
rather than in what we now think of as "law schools," which under this model would mostly
cease to exist.
163. An obvious objection to this kind of reform is that it would produce a two-track
system of legal education: one for ordinary lawyers, consisting of an undergraduate educa-
tion with an emphasis on law followed by a vocational apprenticeship, and one for "elite"
lawyers, featuring several more years of post-graduate education. The reply to this objection
is that as a functional matter, we already have a profoundly hierarchical system of legal edu-
cation, with just a handful of schools producing the large majority of elite lawyers. The main
difference between the new system and the status quo is that, under the status quo, a non-
elite legal education is on average nearly as expensive to obtain as its elite cousin,
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longer that law schools refuse to acknowledge that they are produc-
ing far too many graduates at far too high a cost, the more likely
some sort of radical reform will become. 164
CONCLUSION
The status quo in American legal education has become unsus-
tainable. For many years now, the cost of law school has climbed
relentlessly, while the long-term value of a law degree has deterio-
rated. By the summer of 2012, there were numerous signs that the
inevitable economic and social crisis caused by the simultaneous
continuation of these two trends was finally at legal academia's
doorstep. These signs included a wave of prominent stories in the
nation's print and electronic media questioning the value of law
degrees, several class action lawsuits filed against law schools for al-
legedly fraudulent recruitment practices aimed at prospective stu-
dents, and, most tellingly, a drastic plunge in the number of people
applying to law school.1 65 Indeed, in the 2012-2013 academic year,
American law schools are likely to collect-possibly for the first
time-less tuition revenue than they did in the previous academic
year.' 66 In America today, the idea that law school is a safe and sen-
sible investment in a person's future seems to be moving rapidly
164. Radical reform would come very quickly if law students were suddenly limited to
being able to borrow no more money to attend law school than they could be reasonably
expected to pay back given their future employment prospects.
165. Between 2010 and 2012, the number of applicants to ABA-accredited schools fell
from 87,900 to approximately 67,700 (the latter number is an estimate of the final total based
on the number of applicants through June st-a date at which historically more than 97
percent of applicants within a particular admissions cycle had applied). See Easing Law School
Admission, LSAC, http://www.lsac.org/Members/Data/current-volume.asp (last visited Nov.
15, 2012). In response, one "top tier" law school announced that it planned to reduce the
size of its entering class by 20 percent and to make this reduction permanent. See Staff Reor-
ganization: Overview, UNIV. OF CAL. HASTINGS COLL. OF THE LAW (Mar. 19, 2012), http://
www.uchastings.edu/faculty-administration/chancellor-dean/letters/3-19-12a.html. Many
other schools are apparently preparing to bring in smaller classes as well, even while main-
taining previous levels of "scholarships"-that is, tuition discounts-for incoming students.
For prominent examples of media coverage regarding the declining value of law degrees, see
Nathan Koppel, Law School Loses Its Allure as Jobs at Firms Are Scarce, WALL ST.J., Mar. 17, 2011,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704396504576204692878631986.html;
David Segal, Is Law School a Losing Game? N.Y. TiMEs, Jan. 8, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/
2011/01/09/business/O9aw.html?pagewanted=all; CBS Evening News: Even Lawyers Struggle to
Find Jobs These Days (CBS television broadcast Mar. 8, 2012). For information about the law-
suits, see Matthew Shaer, Law Schools Sued for Lying About Laryering, N.Y. MAO. (Feb. 1, 2012,
12:53 PM), http://nymag.com/daily/intel/2012/02/law-schools-sued-for-lying-about-
lawyering.html.
166. See Matt Leichter, U.S. News Data Show 2011 May Be Beginning of End for Law School
Tuition Bubble, THE Am. L. DAILy (Mar. 19, 2012, 4:31 PM), http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/
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from the status of conventional wisdom to yet another debunked
myth regarding how spending money on higher education is almost
axiomatically a wise thing to do.
If American legal education is to exist in anything like its present
form, then law schools must become much less expensive and pro-
duce far fewer graduates than they do now. If law schools fail to
undertake significant reforms in these directions, then more radical
reforms will be thrust upon them by irresistible economic, political,
and social forces. Whether the future of legal education will be de-
termined by serious internally driven reforms or radical externally
imposed changes is an open question, as is which outcome would
most benefit the legal system and society as a whole. What is not in
question is that major changes are coming to American legal educa-
tion. After all, if something cannot go on forever, it will stop.
amlawdaily/2012/03/us-news-data-show-201 -may-be-beginning-of-end-for-law-school-tuition-
bubble.hml.
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